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RESUMEN
La responsabilidad civil medioambiental sirve como complemento de políticas públicas de regulación. 
Desastres naturales de devastadora magnitud, paralelo al incremento desmesurado de la población 
mundial, han capturado la atención de políticos y legisladores a escala global. Preocupantes informes de 
naturaleza tanto oficial como independiente, concluyen en la imperiosa necesidad de establecer un  
término para el cambio. Los vacíos dejados por débiles instrumentos internacionales sólo pueden ser 
subsanados por el estudio comparativo de aquellas normativas que han probado cierto éxito doméstico. 
Consecuentemente, soluciones europeas y norteamericanas son referenciadas en la actualidad por 
países en desarrollo. En el presente estudio centraremos nuestra atención en tales desarrollos jurídicos, 
especialmente en aquellos brindados por el denominado soft law.
Después de abordar las especiales características del daño medioambiental, en relación con el daño 
tradicional, haremos lo propio con los demás elementos configuratorios de la responsabilidad civil. 
Posteriormente, estudiaremos los elementos característicos de los modelos europeo y norteamericano. 
Intentaremos dar respuesta a la marcada influencia que históricamente ha ejercido el sistema 
norteamericano a nivel mundial, así como si ello resulta retrospectivamente justificable. No pasaremos            
por alto las directivas europeas que desde 1986 hasta 2004 han incorporado importantes avances  
respecto de su par Transatlántico. Este será el primero de subsiguientes esfuerzos por incluir un               
análisis interdisciplinario que involucre tópico tales como la prevención y la autorregulación del daño 
medioambiental. 
ABSTRACT
Environmental liability is the private complement to public regulation. Devastating environmental disasters 
along with an increasing demanding population for natural resources have captured the attention of 
politicians and law makers across the globe. Alarming official and independent research have concluded 
that a deadline for change must be set. The gaps left by weak international instruments can only be filled by 
a comparative analysis of those national legal embodies that have proven certain level of success. 
Admittedly leading legislations such as in the US and Europe play nowadays the role of guides for 
developing countries. In the following paper we focus on how the solutions provided in soft law material of 
the prior could be implemented in the latter. 
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After addressing the special characteristics of environmental tort as compared to traditional tort, we 
examine the elements of environmental civil liability; explore the reasons of why liability standard changed 
in environmental tort, and outline the potential defenses and remedies. In a subsequent section, we 
introduce the main legal principles and doctrines that provide the basis for the environmental civil liability 
regime in the U.S, and compare the two methods primarily used by the U.S. We then examine the 
environmental civil liability structure in the EU. After analyzing the reasons why the EU has had to intervene 
into environmental civil liability field, we chronologically examines every directive with regard to civil liability 
that EU has proposed from 1986 to 2004, and end with a brief conclusion of the features of EU's 
environmental civil liability regime. This is the first of further attempts that will involve an interdisciplinary 
analysis to the problem of incentives and deterrence of environmental damage.
PALABRAS CLAVE
Responsabilidad civil, ambiental, derecho ambiental, políticas públicas ambientales, Soft law.
KEY WORDS
Environmental civil liability, soft law environmental law.
INTRODUCTION 
1 BBC Online, 30.05.10 (available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10194335) (consulted on 10.08.10). 
2 China: Severe Water Pollution in Harbin's River, http://www.voanews.com/burmese/archive/2005-11/2005-11-23-voa6.cfm?CFID
=296560725&CFTOKEN=45652787
“Gulf of Mexico oil leak 'worst US environment 
disaster', said a senior officer”, reported the BBC to 
1the World . According to unconsolidated data, more 
than 76 million barrels of heavy oil have devastated 
over 46.000 square miles of enriched ecosystems. 
Billions of dollars have already been spent by the BP 
and many more wait for the results of thousands of 
judicial claims.  Nonetheless, many will only perceived 
its collateral effects decades later, a situation that 
comprises many jurisprudential challenges. 
thOn November 13 , 2005, a large chemical plant 
exploded in Jilin, an industrial city in China, resulting 
in a severe pollution of a river that provides drinking 
water to Harbin, one of China's largest cities. The 
explosion sent an unknown quantity of benzene into 
Songhua River; benzene is a highly toxic and 
flammable industrial solvent and a known 
carcinogen. Scientists noted that benzene levels in 
the river were more than 100 times the safe level. As 
a result of this incident, water service to the 4 million 
residents of Harbin was suspended for at least four 
2days . Fortunately, nobody died as a result of the 
pollution to the Songhua River; however, this is not 
always the case. In the past 50 years, millions of 
innocent people have died from environmental 
pollution, and the number of people who are 
suffering from diseases caused by environmental 
incidents is even greater. 
The Bhopal Accident is probably the greatest 
industrial disaster in history. Between 1977 and 
1984, UCIL, an Indian company located in a 
crowded working class neighborhood in Bhopal, 
was licensed by the Madhya Pradesh Government 
to manufacture phosgene, monomethylamine 
(MMA), methylisocyanate (MIC) and the pesticide 
carbaryl, all of which were highly contaminated. On 
the night of December 2, 1984, due to the corrosion 
of the stainless steel tanks that contained MIC and 
other reaction products, these highly toxic 
substances escaped from the factory and spread to 
the surrounding areas. What was worse was that 
the emergency sirens had been switched off, and 
therefore, people living around the factory could not 
be warned of this environmental danger. The effect 
of these hazardous substances was immediate and 
devastating. Many innocent people died in their 
sleep; others struggled to get out of their homes, 
blinded and choking, only to die on the streets. 
Revista Jurídica  Piélagus
61
Sa
nt
ia
go
 A
re
al
 L
. -
 Jo
rg
e 
A
lb
er
to
 F
ie
rr
o 
A
.
Hundreds of people died later after arriving at 
hospitals. The estimated number of people who 
died from this environmental disaster was at least 
3,000, while the number of injured people was 
3around 500,000 .
The Bhopal Accident is definitely not the only 
tragedy that was caused by environmental 
pollution. Ever since the 1930s, millions of people 
have been killed in various environmental incidents, 
from air pollution to water pollution, and to land 
pollution. Especially in recent 30 years, there is a 
clear sign that indicates environmental pollution 
tends to be transboundary, not only within one 
single nation, but also many countries that are 
geographically close to each other. Moreover, the 
harm of pollution has the tendency of being more 
severe and the latency much longer. Eventually, 
these characteristics attracted popular attention. 
People began to take many efforts to prevent more 
pollution and also minimize the influence of pollution 
that had already taken place, employing both 
technological and legal means. The legal approach 
to pollution control focused on the liabilities that 
resulted from environmental incidents. The 
questions that resulted contemplated when 
someone should be liable for his action if that action 
causes damages to the environment. Other 
questions included: Could traditional tort theory still 
be applied to modern environmental tort actions? 
Under what conditions can a polluter be exempted 
from his liabilities? 
The United States and European Union are 
considered to be pioneers in the law making areas 
regarding environmental pollution. Even though   
we cannot say that their environmental liability 
systems are perfect, still they largely guide the   
world regarding environmental law. The search for 
international domestically enforceable instruments 
must take into account the steps taken by the so-
4called first-world countries . The existing laws with 
regard to environmental civil liability in developing 
5nations  fail to keep the pace of the development of 
modern environmental torts. 
This paper focuses on the special features of 
modern environmental torts, and discusses how the 
U.S and the EU react to these features in their legal 
systems. Due to the large amount of legal 
instruments directly and subsidiary applicable, a 
first aim refers to soft law. By carefully reviewing 
their environmental civil liability structures, we hope 
this article can help lawmakers of developing 
countries learn from other countries' successes and 
failures in the realm of effective environmental civil 
liability. Special attention will be put on China. Once 
again, a central goal of International regulation shall 
not be discarded. It must be warned that this is the 
first of further attempts that will involve not only 
other embodies of the law but also interdisciplinary 
approaches of it.
This paper first reviews the term “environmental   
civil liability”, and then, it addresses the special 
characteristics of environmental tort as compared  
to traditional tort, examines the elements of 
environmental civil liability, explores the reasons of 
why liability standard changed in environmental tort, 
and outlines the potential defenses and remedies. 
In the next section, it introduces the main legal 
principles and doctrines that provide the basis for 
the environmental civil liability regime in the U.S, 
and compares the two methods primarily used by 
the U.S. It then examines the environmental civil 
liability structure in the EU. After analyzing the 
reasons why the EU has had to intervene into 
environmental civil liability field, it chronologically 
examines every directive with regard to civil liability 
that EU has proposed from 1986 to 2004, and ends 
with a brief conclusion of the features of EU's 
environmental civil liability regime.
3 http://www.corrosion-doctors.org/Pollution/bhopal.htm.
4 A strong but undoubtedly refutable assumption suggests that economic development goes hand-to-hand to appropriate regulation on the 
usage of natural resources. This seems to hold at least on own jurisdictions. The issue here is not whether countries such the US or Germany 
misuse foreign natural resources (they might at least in some subsidized industries, or whenever raw materials are underpriced); but as how 
environmental statutes achieved the pursued goal of punishment and deterrence.
5 Once again, the concept of “developing country” is not related to economic growth. As a matter of example, China has unsuccessfully tried to 
harmonized GDP with environmental sustainability.
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1. DEFINITION, SPECIAL FEATURES AND 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL LIABILITY
Environmental civil liability is a main component of 
the liability regime for environmental damages. 
Although it shares many theories with traditional tort 
system, it is not exactly the same one that appears 
in traditional tort. The special features of 
environmental tort demand distinctions and 
improvements from the traditional tort regime. This 
section provides an overall review of environmental 
civil liability and discusses its similarities and 
distinctions with traditional tort.
1.1. Definition of Environmental Civil Liability
To explore the definition of environmental civil 
liability, it is a good choice to start with the term 
“liability.” Generally speaking, liability has two 
meanings. On one hand, it is defined as “the quality 
or state of being legally obligated or accountable; 
legal responsibility to another or to society, 
enforceable by civil remedy or criminal 
6punishment.”  At this point, it is also termed legal 
7liability; responsibility; subjection.  Concretely 
speaking, in this sense, liability is used in two ways. 
First, it is the synonym of duty, the correlative of 
8right, and the opposite of privilege or liberty.  “If a 
duty rests upon someone, society is commanding 
9performance by him and threatening penalties.”
For example, everyone has the liability to follow the 
statutes and regulations. Second and more often, 
liability is used as the correlative of power and the 
10opposite of immunity . In this case “society is not 
yet commanding performance, but it will so 
command if the possessor of the power does some 
operative act. If one has a power, the other has a 
11liability.”  According to this definition, you are liable 
for assaulting someone else. On the other hand, 
liability sometimes refers to “a financial pecuniary 
12obligation,”  and is used in plural form, such as in 
13the phrase “assets and liabilities.”  The term liability 
discussed through this paper is especially referred 
to the second aspect under the first meaning.
When one is legally obligated for civil damages, he 
or she is supposed to hold civil liability for the 
damages. Similarly, when one's conduct causes 
environmental damage so as to infringe other 
people's private rights, he or she has to accept 
environmental civil liability for his or her conduct. In 
civil law countries, environmental civil liability 
mainly consists of environmental tort liability, which 
is regulated under various statutes and regulations, 
while in common law countries, environmental tort 
liability refers to a liability that comes about through 
common-law notions of tort theory, such as 
trespass, nuisance or negligence. In contrast, civil 
liability refers specifically to liabilities that are set 
forth in statutes, created by legislatures. To avoid 
confusion, environmental civil liability is used as a 
general concept that is comprised of both tort 
liability and other liabilities for breach of statutory 
duty throughout this paper. Together with 
environmental criminal liability and administrative 
liability, environmental civil liability constitutes the 
liability regime for environmental damage.
1.2. Characteristics of Environmental Tort as 
Compared to Traditional Tort
In recent times, air pollution brings out images of 
urban smog and acid rain that affect the whole 
public, imposes incalculable risks, and emanates 
from uncertain sources. However, the action has 
moved elsewhere to some degree. Insults from 
smoke, noise and odors to the public have been 
overshadowed by a chemical revolution that seems 
to portend quantities of unseen risks in everyday life 
from the synthetic products that we routinely 
6
 Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), LIABILITY.
7
 Id. 
8
 William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 9 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919).
9
 Id.
10
 Id.
11
 Id.
12
 Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 1.
13
 Id.
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14encounter.   With these changes, over the last two 
decades, a new class of torts has emerged that 
targets personal injuries caused by toxic 
substances in the environment. These hybrid 
environmental torts are quite different from the 
trespass-nuisance precedent that is part of 
traditional tort theory. 
1.2.1. Indirect Tort Action
Tort is divided to direct tort and indirect tort. Most 
traditional torts are direct, which means that the 
conduct functions directly upon victims, while in 
environmental tort, the conduct first pollutes the 
environment, which then causes personal injuries 
or / and property damages. Thus, in environmental 
tort, most conduct seems not to have a direct causal 
link with the harm suffered by victims. The nature of 
environmental tort is that such tort uses 
environment as a medium to cause harm to people, 
either their bodies or properties.
1.2.2. Difficulty of Determining Defendant
Identification of defendants who are liable for the 
environmental damage is harder to figure out than in 
traditional tort. As in any tort action, to bring an 
environmental tort suit the plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant is responsible for the harm at issue. 
But the source of the environmental contaminant is 
not always easily identifiable, especially if that 
substance was released into the environment long 
ago. Moreover, in some cases there are multiple 
sources of the environmental pollutant that brings 
harm to the plaintiff. Even when all potential sources 
can be identified, it may be difficult or impossible             
to determine the proportion of each source's 
15responsibility for the total harm that has occurred.
1.2.3. Difficulty of Pinpointing Plaintiff
Just like the frequent difficulty to identify the party or 
parties responsible for causing the environmental 
harms, it may also be difficult to determine the party 
or parties who have suffered injury caused            
by harmful environmental exposure. This 
characteristic of environmental tort is closely related 
to the character of the environmental elements. 
Generally speaking, environmental elements 
consist of natural elements and social elements. 
Here it refers to those natural elements such as 
water, air, rock, living creatures, sunshine and soil. 
Environmental tort is an indirect tort action that uses 
environmental elements as its intermediary. Natural 
elements such as water, air and living creatures are 
part of the environmental cycle. Meanwhile, those 
pollutants or contaminants are also in the cycle and 
are brought everywhere by the natural elements. In 
other words, environmental pollution is not limited to 
one area. For instance, a sandstorm in north China 
can influence South Korea and Japan. Take disease 
for another example. Many diseases have multiple 
causes. For most diseases there is a “background 
rate” at which the population contracts the 
16disease.  Even if exposure to a substance is known 
to cause a particular type of cancer to those 
exposed, some of the exposed population would 
have developed this form of cancer even though 
17they are absent from the exposure.  And these 
individuals would have figured in the background 
18rate.  Thus, there is no affirmative answer to the 
question whether the exposure to a substance that 
could have caused a particular disease in a 
particular plaintiff did in fact cause the disease in 
that plaintiff. Therefore, sometimes it is a big 
problem to determine the plaintiff.
1.2.4. Unequal Status of Plaintiff and Defendant
Fairness is the soul of civil law, and therefore, the 
most obvious character of civil law is that the status 
of plaintiff and defendant are equal. Traditionally, 
tort occurs between farmers, craftspeople and small 
proprietors. Since the status of plaintiff and 
defendant is equal, it is possible that their identities 
14 Huanjingfa Yuanli [Principles of Environmental Law] 157, ( Lv Zhongmei ed., 1st ed., 2007) Fudan Press.
15 See Kenneth S. Arbraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 Va. L. Rev. 845 (1987).
16 See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort Syetem, 97 Harv. L. Rev.849 (1984).
17 Id.
18
 Id.
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exchange later, which means a plaintiff could be a 
defendant in another tort case. By contrast in 
environmental tort, defendants are usually 
enterprises that are equipped with advanced 
techniques and updated information and have a 
special economic status in the country while the 
plaintiffs or victims are ordinary people that have 
little knowledge about, and evidence of, the sorts of 
chemicals that plants leak or emit. They have 
problems to establish the legal causation between 
the harm they suffer and the breaching of duty by an 
enterprise or enterprises. Moreover, the litigants are 
uncertain about the chemicals to which they have 
been exposed and may discover the injury only after 
the statute of limitations has run. 
1.2.5. Problems of Identifying the Damage
Throughout the centuries of tort law development, 
the identification of an injury has hardly ever been a 
problem. It is most of the time the unexpected 
intrusion on other people's land or violation of a right 
19to bodily integrity.  In contrast, in environmental 
tort, toxics such as impure water, hazardous 
chemicals, and defective synthetics often breed 
disease rather than cause immediate injury. These 
diseases do not occur instantaneously. And 
because diseases are frequently a product of the 
background risks of living, technical information is 
essential to establish causal link between the 
tortious conduct and the harm. Thus, identification 
of the injury, ordinarily a routine issue in traditional 
tort, is a costly task that relies on types of evidence 
and probability judgments which can be regarded 
as ill-suited to traditional resolution through the 
20adversary process.
1.2.6. Long Latency of Harm
As to most traditional torts, once the tort action 
occurs, the harm comes out with the action, and 
such harm also disappears once the action stops. 
However, in environmental tort, harms usually last 
for a considerably long time. For instance, on April 
26, 1986, a nuclear leak and explosion took place in 
21Russian Chernobyl nuclear power plant.  Thirty-
22one people died on the day of the leak.  Tens of 
thousands of people died or suffered serious illness 
23as a result of the radioactive fallout.  To this day, 
24radiation causes serious birth defects.  Thus, the 
environmental damage lasts for at least 21 years, 
with no way of knowing how much longer these 
terrible effects will continue. Moreover, many 
damages take place slowly and invisibly, only to 
become detectable many years after the event that 
caused the damage. Just like certain diseases, 
there is a long latency period between the time of 
exposure to a pollutant and the time the diseases 
resulting from that exposure manifest themselves. 
Another possibility is that some environmental 
damages may begin to occur immediately or soon 
after the release of a substance, but at that time they 
are not detected or detectable. It is not until many 
years later do people suddenly realize the existence 
of those harms. For example, hazardous waste   
can seep into groundwater and begin to migrate 
offsite shortly after it is deposited, but the resulting 
contamination of drinking water may not be 
25discovered until much later.  
In fact, other characteristics of environmental tort 
are each partly related to the uncertainties that 
result from the long latency of many environmental 
damages. Traditionally, it is the plaintiff who bears 
the burden of proof in a tort claim. Proof of the 
evidence of negligence (or in some cases the 
requisites of strict liability), causal connection, and 
both past and future damages is therefore required. 
Yet because of the long latency of most of the harms 
at issue in environmental tort cases, evidence of 
exactly what the defendant did may be uncertain; 
scientific and medical proof of a causal link between 
the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury 
may make it difficult to adduce. Further, the long 
19
 See Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and The Tort System, 24 Hous. L. Rev. 27 (1987).
20
 Id.
21
 The Accident in Chernobyl, http://baike.baidu.com/view/412925.htm. 
22
 Id.
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental Regulation: An Analytical Overview, 41 Washburn L.J. 379.
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latency of harm also brings difficulties in identifying 
defendants and pinpointing victims.
1.2.7. Severity of the Harm
Environmental torts are usually more severe than 
those of traditional torts not only because of their 
long latency and post-generational consequences, 
but also because of the difficulty to limit them within 
a certain boundary. The crux of the matter is the 
distinction between the accidents. The harm 
suffered in an airplane crash is extensive but it is 
also bounded. Most of the victims die, but apart from 
derivative loss, there are virtually no consequences 
beyond the very spot of the crash. On the contrary, 
in environmental torts, the damages are potentially 
unbounded. Take Chernobyl nuclear power plant for 
example again. After the explosion, the radiation 
expanded with wind to the western area of former 
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and even reached 
the Scandinavian Peninsula, resulting in the             
deaths of more than 4,000 people and various 
26sicknesses.  In a word, the extent of an 
environmental disaster is just unpredictable and  
the array of disorders is far more wide-ranging.
1.2.8. Reasonableness of the Tortious Action
Actions, such as those that causing physical injury 
or property damage to other people, are most of the 
time endangering social order and security. 
However, it is hard to conclude that conducts 
constituting environmental torts are the same as 
those in traditional torts. Basically they are legal 
actions, or to say, at least not prohibited by law. For 
instance, there is no law forbidding pouring waste 
water into rivers; one is not liable until such pouring 
pollutes the waters and inflicts personal damages. 
Unlike beating someone on the face that directly 
violates the right of that person's body integrity, 
pouring water itself does not violate any law. 
Therefore, under most circumstances, the actions 
that cause environmental torts are not illegal.
1.2.9. Inevitability of the Tortious Action
Compared to people in traditional torts who may be 
able to avoid the damages once they exercise due 
care, operators in environmental torts may still be 
unable to avoid the damages even if they           
have already exercised duty of care with the 
knowledge of modern techniques. The reason is 
that environmental damages are the “by-product” of 
the manufacture of industrialization and civilization. 
It is the price that human beings have to pay for the 
use and change of nature. If environmental torts 
were completely eliminated, people would have to 
step back to the primitive society.
1.3. Elements of Environmental Liability 
under Tort
What elements constitute environmental torts         
is the threshold question to the environmental      
27civil liability.  It is also one of the fundamental 
28questions to the theory of environmental tort.  
Since environmental tort is a special kind of tort, the 
understanding of the components of environmental 
tort is closely related to the elements of traditional 
tort.
The differences between the requirements of the 
29various torts relate to just a few points.  Since the 
basic complaint in a tort case is “You hurt me,” the 
three crucial focal points are, first, what the alleged 
tortfeasor did; second, what the claimant suffered in 
consequence; and third, how the suffering resulted 
30from the conduct.  It is very important to keep these 
matters distinct. How the defendant behaved is the 
cause and what the claimant suffered is the effect. 
Both of these are provable facts. How the conduct 
resulted in the harm is not quite as provable as the 
first two. It is the relationship between those two 
facts, which is called “causation”. In conclusion, the 
three focal elements are conduct, harm, and 
causation.
26 http://news.sohu.com/s2006/06qenbl/
27 Cao Mingde, Huanjing Qinquanfa [Environmental Tort Law] 158, the Legal Press (2000).
28 Id.
29 Tony Weir, Tort Law 12, Oxford University Press, (2002).
30 Id.
66
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1.3.1. Conduct
For centuries, fault has been considered the            
31basis of tortious conduct.  By 1850's, it became 
increasingly accepted that “sound policy lets losses 
lie where they fall, except where a special reason 
32can be shown for interference.”  Apart from a few 
exceptional situations such special reason was the 
33tortfeasor's fault.  A person at fault was guilty not 
only of a legal wrong but also of an ethical wrong. As 
Professor Fleming once said: “the triumph of fault 
liability was well-nigh complete and marked a 
singular judicial triumph in remolding ancient 
34precedents in the image of a radically different ear.”
However, when it comes to environmental tort, fault 
tends to be neither one of the characters of tortious 
conduct and nor a requirement of tortious liability. 
Rather, the principal focus rests with the 
relationship between conduct and harm. In other 
words, one can be held liable not only when one 
intends to cause an invasion of an environmental 
interest legally protected, or when one negligently 
creates an unreasonable risk of invasion of such an 
interest, but also when one carries on a conduct at 
the risk that the actor shall be subject to liability for 
the environmental harm caused thereby. This is true 
even if no such harm is intended and the harm 
cannot be prevented by any precautions or care 
which it is practicable to require. Once the causal 
link between the conduct and the environmental 
harm has been established, whether the actor is 
subjectively wrong or his conduct is illegal are 
beyond concern. The reason for such tendency is 
that victims of environmental damages generally 
lack sufficient resources to challenge polluters and 
they need law to protect them. Furthermore, most of 
the environmental damages are large-scale 
disasters, holding polluters accountable and 
deterring them from harming the environment.
1.3.2. Harm
There are various kinds of harms in environmental 
torts, such as damage to property, physical harm, 
psychiatric injury and illness, and also infringement 
35of the rights to environment.
Damage to property is calculable economic loss. It 
36can be further divided into two forms.  The first one 
is directly caused by the environmental tortious 
conduct. For example, a fish pond is polluted by the 
waste water discharged by a chemical factory. A 
large quantity of fish die and Mark, the owner of the 
pond suffers the loss of much money. The other 
form is the economic loss brought by bodily harm or 
psychiatric injury. It is indirectly caused by the 
environmental tortious conduct. For instance, the 
same Mark gets sick after eating the fish from the 
polluted pond. Money he has to pay for the 
treatment of his illness and the loss of salary when 
he is in the hospital also constitutes property 
damage.
Physical harm usually appears in the form of death 
37or loss of bodily functions.  For example, from 
1953-1968, people at Minamata Bay in Kumamoto 
Prefecture, Japan, consumed fish, shellfish and 
other aquatic organisms living in the gulf, which had 
been polluted by sewage containing mercury and 
methylmercury. Nearly 10,000 people suffered from 
a variety of central nerve diseases. Among the 283 
patients who were poisoned by methylmercury, 
38more than 60 died .
Another example of environmental harm is injury to 
psyche, which manifests itself in victims' mental 
suffering and flesh pain. Neurasthenia resulting 
from noise pollution is one kind of injury. Since such 
injury is hard to see, feel and figure out by other 
people except for the victim, it is also called invisible 
31 See Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law, Clarendon Press (5th ed., 2003).
32
 Id, at 42.
33
 Id, at 42.
34
 Fleming, J.G., The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 Virginia LR 815 (1967).
35
 Cao Mingde, Huanjing Qinquanfa [Environmental Tort Law] 158, the Legal Press (2000).
36
 Id.
37
 Id.
38
 Eight World Well-known Environmental Hazards Incidents,
   http://bbs.hitfm.cn/lofiversion/index.php/t43381.html.
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39harm.  In common law countries, damages cannot 
be recovered for mere grief or emotional distress 
from an injury or death of someone else, even if that 
40someone is a loved one.   However, mere grief and 
a serious, prolonged psychiatric condition are 
different in principle. The latter may be identified 
41with the help of expert medical testimony.   Medical 
science now recognizes a condition known as “post-
traumatic stress disorder”, which may occur in 
reaction to the violent or unexpected death of a 
42close relative or friend.  The starting point is the 
case Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, 
in which plaintiffs were held to be compensated for 
43their psychiatric injury.  In Japan, when deciding 
the case of hazardous pollution in Yokkaichi, judges 
44also took psychiatric injuries into consideration.               
In China, although there are no provisions for 
psychiatric damages in civil law, compensation for 
psychiatric injury from environmental pollution does 
exist in practice.
Loss of the right to environment is also a                          
type of environmental harm. Right to environment  
is defined as the right of the public to have                        
a healthy, secure, quiet, comfortable and                
45graceful environment.  Infringement of rights to 
environment means interference with the public's 
enjoyment of the environment. For instance, the 
construction of a building that is beyond the 
maximum height set by law interferes in the 
neighboring public's right to sunshine. 
1.3.3. Causation
To become liable to another under tort law 
principles, an actor's conduct must not only be 
tortious in character but it must also cause harm to 
46another's interest.  Scholars from both common 
law and civil law countries have studied the causal 
connection in traditional torts and brought up 
various theories, but in practice, it is clear that these 
theories have problems of being implemented. So it 
is still not an easy task to establish the causation in 
environmental damages.
1.3.3.1. Difficulties in establishing causal link 
for environmental damages
Damage arising from environmental torts 
constitutes a form of indirect consequential harm. 
Thus, the causal connection between the allegedly 
tortious conduct and the alleged consequential 
harm can be undermined by intervening factors or 
other possible causes. The industrial revolution led 
to a rapid increase in development with the result 
that it became increasingly difficult for a victim to 
determine which of the pollutants should be 
responsible for the harm he suffered. In the post-
industrial revolution era, there is hardly only one 
possible candidate for the source of environmental 
pollution; instead, the public has found themselves 
surrounded by belching chimneys and overflowing 
drainpipes. It is quite common that there are a 
number of different industries within one area, each 
producing different substances. Undoubtedly, 
scientific techniques have progressed rapidly in the 
past decades; however, it is still often extremely 
difficult to establish causation since sometimes 
even the latest scientific knowledge and techniques 
are still not capable of isolating the individual 
elements and tracing them to their respective 
sources. Just as Michael Garvey, a famous British 
lawyer, stated in giving evidence to a Select 
Committee on Noxious Vapors, that it was almost 
39
 Id, at 174.
40
 Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law, at 42, Clarendon Press (5th ed., 2003).
41
 Id, at 96.
42
 Id, at 96.
43
 Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1992] 1 A.C. 310. In this case, the relatives and friends of spectators who were crushed to death 
inside a football stadium as a result of police negligence brought actions for damages based on psychiatric illness suffered in reaction to the 
event. The court held that the plaintiffs should get compensations for the psychiatric damage.
44
 Eight World Well-known Environmental Hazards Incidents,
http://bbs.hitfm.cn/lofiversion/index.php/t43381.html.  In 1961 in Yokkaichi, Japan, the exhaust gas from the smelting of petroleum and 
industrial fuel caused serious air pollution, resulted in a sharp increase of respiratory diseases, especially asthma. This incident is regarded as 
one of the prominent environmental issues.
45 Cao Mingde, Huanjing Qinquanfa [Environmental Tort Law] at 174.
46 REST 2d TORTS §9 (1965).
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impossible to establish liability because of “the 
difficulty of selecting any one of those effluvia and 
tracing it up to its source, so as to bring it home to 
manufacturer by legal evidence. We have always 
47been defeated on this point. ” Admittedly, with the 
improvement of science, increasingly complex links 
between latent toxic substances and diverse kinds 
of health problems have been discovered. 
However, it is one thing to discover a possible 
connection, it is quite another to provide sufficient 
proof of the link to establish liabilities.
1.3.3.2. Establishing causation for 
damages
In some environmental pollution cases, a toxin is 
often only one of a number of possible causes for a 
particular illness. However, even a small dose of this 
certain toxin may increase the incidence of certain 
illnesses; this is referred to as the “stochastic 
48effect” . This fact is already beginning to challenge 
the existing legal tests for establishing causation.
a.  Causal Link in Traditional Tort
The actual cause and the proximate cause             
inquiry lie at the core of the causation element in 
traditional tort. The actual causation is important           
in the plaintiff's prima facie case. Given the 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, 
this means that the plaintiff must prove that it was 
more probable than not that the defendant's 
conduct functioned as a cause of the plaintiff's 
49injury.  This causation is usually guided by a 
particular legal standard. This standard is known as 
the but-for test, also called the “sine qua non” or 
50“counterfactual” test.  In U.S. jurisdictions, the but-
for test is the predominant test for an actual 
51causation.  Under the but-for test, the claimant 
environmental 
must prove the existence of a causal connection on 
the balance of probabilities, which is taken to mean 
a likelihood of more than 50 per cent. If the court 
finds that it was just as likely that the damages 
would have occurred without the defendant's 
conduct, the action will fail even if there is an 
admission of fault.
The primary issue posed by proximate cause 
doctrine is whether there is something about the 
causal link between defendant's conduct and 
plaintiff's harm that warrants freeing the defendant 
from responsibility for that injury notwithstanding 
52that connection . In other words, it indicates that 
liabilities should attach for conduct that has caused 
the harm only if that conduct is sufficiently near to 
the harm either in time or space. A famous case 
under this theory is Moershigelafu v. Long Island 
53Railway Corporation . The accident occurred in 
August, 1924, in the New York Long Island Railway 
station. The plaintiff Mrs. Moershigelafu and her 
daughter were waiting on the platform for their train. 
Meanwhile, there was another train to a different 
destination starting to move. Two passengers late 
for that train began to run in order to catch it. One of 
them jumped into the train with ease; while the other 
eventually made it but nearly fell down. A staff on the 
platform tried to gave him a hand by pushing him on 
the back. At that time, the passenger's backpack 
that contained fireworks dropped on the railroad 
and exploded. The explosion blew down several 
signposts along the platform, and some of the flying 
debris injured Mrs. Moershigelafu. Mrs. 
Moershigelafu brought a lawsuit against New York 
Long Island Railroad Corporation, and asked for 
compensation. The court held that the Corporation 
was not liable for Mrs. Moershigelafu's injury 
because the staff's pushing was an indirect cause 
that was too remote from the injury in the causal 
chain.
47 Select Committee on Noxious Vapors (1982), Minutes of Evidence 23, Q 238.
48 Mark Wilde, Civil Liability for Environmental Damage, A Comparative Analysis of Law and Policy in Europe and the United States, Kluwer Law 
International (2002).
49 John C.P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok, Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law, Responsibilities and Redress, ∧SPEN Publishers (2004).
50 Id.
51 In certain situations, however, courts employ an alternative test known as the substantial factor test.
52 Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law, at 42, Clarendon Press (5th ed., 2003).
53 http://dzl.legaltheory.com.cn/info.asp?id=9083
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b.  Causal Link in Environmental Tort
Even though the actual cause and proximate cause 
theories have well functioned in traditional torts for 
centuries, difficulties arise when people try to apply 
those standards into establishing environmental 
torts. Due to the limitations of science and 
technology, it is hard to trace the sources of the 
pollution and find out the actual cause of the 
environmental damage. Even if explanations of the 
events leading up to the harm are found, it is still quite 
troublesome to prove causation with epidemiological 
and other toxicological evidence with the threshold 
set by the but for test, or to say, the more-likely-than-
not standard. To make it simple, suppose in City A, 
one would expect to see 10000 cases of asthma over 
a ten-year period. But ever since the air has been 
polluted and contained toxins from the smelting of 
petroleum and industrial fuel, the residence in City A 
now experience a 10% increase in their risk of 
developing asthma. Therefore, instead of 10000 
cases of asthma every ten years, one would find 
11000 cases. This means that 1000 out of the 11000 
cases are attributable to the air pollution. The ratio of 
developing asthma attributable to the air pollution is 
only 9.1%, dividing 1000 by 11000. But since no 
more than 10% of individuals have asthma as a 
result of the air pollution and this rate is far from 51%, 
nobody could satisfy the more-likely-than-not 
standard of causation. When toxins that caused 
environmental damages do not have high 
attributable fractions, the probabilities fail to satisfy 
the more-likely-than-not standard, and cannot lead 
to successful tort litigation. 
Since in environmental tort litigation, the more-  
likely-than-not threshold obviously has flaws,      
such a standard should be abandoned in favor of 
54“conjecture causation.”  Under this standard, a 
victim only needs to show some signs which indicate 
that there is a connection between his damage and 
the tortious conduct. Courts are much likely to 
suppose that the connection does exist unless the 
alleged individual or company can prove that it has 
nothing to do with the environmental harm. This 
represents a move away from traditional theories that 
emphasize possibilities and ignore the weakened 
status of victims in the environmental damages.
In the U.S, there is another notion of causation 
which is called probabilistic causation. It means 
imposing liability “in proportion to the person 
according to the probability of causation, or                   
55the attributable fraction of disease.”   Within the 
last few years, courts have slowly adopted the 
56standard of probabilistic causation . There have 
been quite a few major settlements based on the 
57notions of probabilistic causation.
The new threshold in environmental torts, either 
conjecture causation or probabilistic causation, 
eliminates a great deal of the concern about the 
suits brought by many people who are exposed to 
environmental toxins, but who would today fail to 
reach the more-likely-than-not standard. It is likely 
to become a major part of the positive theory of 
environmental litigation.
c.  Burden of Proof
In traditional tort, the demands of establishing a 
causal link place a heavy evidentiary burden on           
58the plaintiff.  In the conjecture causation theories 
discussed above, such burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant. The rationale for doing this lies in the fact 
that a plaintiff in an environmental tort case usually 
faces an inherent difficulty in finding evidence which 
can establish absolutely that the damage is 
attributable to one potential source of harm rather 
than another. 
Some may argue that this shift of burden theory 
appears to be a little unfair to the defendants; 
54 See Huanjingfa Yuanli [Principles of Environmental Law] 157, Fudan Press, ( Lv Zhongmei ed., 1st ed., 2007).
55 Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1993). at 62.
56 Id.
57 See Habitants Against Landfill Toxicants v. City of New York, 15 Envtl. L. rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20937 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20, 1985); Ayers v. Township 
of Jackson, 525 A. 2d 287 (N.J. 1987); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 f. Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
58 Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law, at 42, Clarendon Press (5th ed., 2003).
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however, considering the superior resources 
possessed by defendants, providing evidence        
to prove that a defendant is innocent of the 
environmental damage would not be as 
burdensome as it is for a plaintiff who suffers from 
inherent evidentiary difficulties. Besides, to do so 
may impose a strong incentive for careful behaviors 
on the part of defendants.
Up to now in China, e.g. there are no statutes or 
regulations about the shift of burden or conjecture 
causation. In the latest version of China's Civil 
Procedure Law, which is modified on October 28, 
2007, and becomes effective on April 1, 2008, it is 
regulated that any person who brings a civil lawsuit 
59to court has the burden of proof.  However, in the 
Opinions about the Applications of Civil Procedure 
Law in People's Republic of China, article 74 gives a 
specific statement about the shift of burden: in the 
lawsuit of environmental damages, defendant who 
denies the committing or involvement of the tortious 
60conduct has the burden of proof.
Moreover, the conjecture causation theory has 
been widely admitted and applied in the practice of 
environmental pollution cases in China. It was first 
applied in the case of Wang Juan v. Qingdao 
61Chemical Plant as early as 1980.  The fact of the 
case is that on July 1, due to the lightening strike on 
the wirings in Qingdao Chemical Plant, a great deal 
of chlorine leaked out of a container. Approximately 
ten people living near the plant developed 
symptoms of toxicosis. Ms. Wang Juan was one of 
them. Her residence was within the area seriously 
polluted by chlorine. The night of the accident, Ms. 
Wang suffered from bronchial asthma because she 
breathed in excessive amounts of chlorine. Despite 
a favorable recovery after a long period of hospital 
treatment, the asthma broke out aperiodically. In the 
April of 1980, Ms. Wang brought a lawsuit against 
Qingdao Chemical Plant. Qingdao Chemical Plant 
refused Ms. Wang's compensation request claiming 
that chlorine toxicosis had nothing to do with 
bronchial asthma, and thus, Wang Juan's suffering 
from aperiodical asthma was unrelated to the leak of 
chlorine. The intermediate court in the city of 
Qingdao held that the plant was liable for Wang 
Juan's injury because there was a causal link 
between Ms. Wang's suffering and the leak of 
chlorine. The causation was established because: 
(1) a large quantity of epidemiologic evidence 
attested to the consequence between the inbreath 
of chlorine and the developing of asthma; (2) the 
hospital thought that Wang Juan's developing of 
asthma could be caused by inbreathing of too much 
chlorine or other materials; (3) Wang Juan had 
never had bronchial asthma before and neither had 
her close relatives; and (4) Wang Juan developed 
asthma just after the leak of chlorine from Qingdao 
Chemical Plant. This is an exact example of the 
application of conjecture causation and this is also 
the very first case concerning environmental civil 
liability in China.
1.3.3.3 Causation for damage vs. causation for 
scope of compensation
Causation does not only exist between tortious 
conduct and the damage but also lies between the 
conduct and remedy. Confirming causation for the 
scope of compensation is the next step after 
establishing causation for harm. To set up the 
connection between the conduct and the scope of 
compensation, it seems to be unfair to the 
defendants who have been alleged for the 
environmental torts if the conjecture causation 
standard is again applied. As a consequence, to 
determine how much a defendant is liable for the 
damage, the standard of foreseeability is a good 
choice. In other words, the compensation for the 
damage caused by the environmental tortious 
conduct has to be foreseeable, and within a 
reasonable scope.
59 Civil Procedure Law of People's Republic of China,§6, article 64 (October 28, 2007) http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/print_48fe98ed01000czp.html
60 Opinions about the Applications of Civil Procedure Law in People's Republic of China, article 74 (July 14, 1992)
http://www.mslv.net/yljf/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=160
61 Wang Juan v. Qingdao Chemical Plant (1980) http://www.riel.whu.edu.cn/show.asp?ID=1498.
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1.3.4. Standards of Environmental Tort Liability
Environmental tort, compared to traditional tort, has 
some unique features. However, because the 
former originates from the latter, the two types of 
liability share common features. For this reason, to 
study the standards of environmental tort liability, it 
is necessary to analyze various criteria of traditional 
tort liability.
1.3.4.1.  Criteria of liability
Criterion of liability refers to the standard used to 
determine whether someone's conduct is tortious or 
62not.  This is one of the fundamental questions when 
63deciding the existence of tort liability.  The changing 
of the criteria of liabilities is the main line of the 
development of torts, which starts from singleness 
and develops into pluralistic concepts. 
1.3.4.2.  Absolute liability standard
Once someone is affirmed to be the person who 
causes harm, the harm itself is sufficient to make 
64that person liable for his conduct.  Under this 
circumstance, no other proof is needed. In a word, if 
there is harm, there is liability. This criterion was 
prevailing in the early age of human society, namely, 
65the time before industrial society.
a.  Fault-based Liability Standard
Fault-based liability is “based on some degree of 
66 .67blameworthiness.”  It is also termed fault liability  
Fault is the only factor that judges have to take into 
consideration when deciding if the subject of the 
conduct is a tortfeasor or not. In another word, it 
does not matter that the subject acts either 
intentionally or negligently. Once there is fault, there 
is liability. This criterion developed right after the 
68germination of capitalism.  It completely replaced 
harm liability theory in the movement of Roman Law 
Revivification, which took place at the beginning of 
th 69 ththe 11  century.  By the 19  century, the fault liability 
standard had obtained the dominant place in the 
criteria of liability in most capitalist countries, such 
70as France, England, and Germany.
b.  Constructive Fault-based Liability Standard
This standard means when defendant cannot prove 
that he acts without any fault, he should be liable for 
the damage he causes. When the standard applies, 
the burden of proof shifts to the person who is sued 
for his tortious conduct. It changes the principle in 
traditional torts that plaintiff has to prove his claim. 
The aim of applying such a standard is to better 
protect the people harmed by tortious conduct.
c.  Strict Liability Standard
Once this standard is applied, liability does not 
71“depend on actual negligence or intent to harm.”  
Instead, it is based on “the breach of an absolute 
72 duty to make something safe.” Strict liability usually 
applies “either to ultrahazardous activities or in 
73products-liability cases.”  It is also called liability 
without fault in some countries. The main idea of this 
principle originates from “Reasonable Share of the 
Calamity”, which is brought by a German scholar, 
74Professor Esser.
62 Zhang Xinbao, Zhongguo Qinquanxingweifa, [Tort Law in China], 42, Social Science Press (1998).
63 Id.
64 Cao Mingde, Huanjing Qinquanfa [Environmental Tort Law] 146, the Legal Press (2000).
65 Id. at 147.
66 Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)
67 Id.
68 Cao Mingde, Huanjing Qinquanfa [Environmental Tort Law] 147, the Legal Press (2000).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)
72 Id.
73 Cao Mingde, Huanjing Qinquanfa [Environmental Tort Law] 148, the Legal Press (2000).
74 Miao Wanwen, Lun Huanjing Qinquan de Guize Yuanze [A Discussion of Liability Criteria in Environmental Torts],
 http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/13661078.html
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d.  Equitable Liability Standard
When neither of the two parties has fault in the 
damage, sometimes courts may apply this 
75standard.  The disparity of assets owned by each 
party and other such factors will be taken into 
76consideration in this situation.  And courts order the 
tortfeasor to compensate for the property loss 
77suffered by the victim.  Equitable liability standard 
is quite controversial among academics, since  
most scholars believe that it causes uncertainty     
in outcomes. But it is still quite popular in the legal 
78practice in China.
1.3.4.3. Liability standards in environmental 
torts
Liability criteria in environmental torts are 
experiencing a change from a subjective standard 
to an objective standard, or specifically speaking, 
from fault-based liability to strict liability standard. 
In the past, when an environmental tort case was 
presented in front of a court, judges most of the    time 
were unwilling to accept that environmental pollution 
79is dangerous.  Therefore, judges usually applied the 
fault-based liability standard. As a consequence, the 
plaintiff was required to prove that the care exercised 
by the polluter was below a reasonable standard. As 
discussed above in “Characteristics of Environmental 
Torts as Compared to Traditional Torts”, there is 
frequently a certain latency period between the 
exposure to the pollution and discovery of injury, and 
by the time of the lawsuit, much of the important 
evidence may be unavailable to the plaintiff. This 
resulted in a tremendous burden for the victims in 
environmental pollution.
It did not take long before people realized that 
environmental pollution was extremely harmful. 
Now courts tend to be friendly to potential plaintiffs 
in environmental litigation, and the strict liability 
standard was brought into environmental tort 
80cases.  As opposed to the fault-based liability 
standard, which operates on subjective intentio-
nality, strict liability standard heavily relies on the 
objective fact of damage or injury. It helps courts to 
identify the best preventer of injury and to affix 
81liability,  especially when the defendant has greater 
information than the courts and the plaintiff.
In common law countries, an increasing number of 
environmental pollution victims have used nuisance 
or “engaging in extremely dangerous activities”     
as the cause of action instead of intentional tort or 
negligence, because based on these causes of 
action, courts will apply the strict liability standard to 
the defendants. Even though it is quite rare, courts 
might consider the subjective conditions of a 
defendant- intent to do or negligently causes the 
harm in a nuisance case, in a lawsuit brought based 
on extremely dangerous activities, courts will 
definitely impose strict liability standard for the injury 
or damage. 
The first case that applied the strict liability standard 
in a lawsuit brought for extremely dangerous 
82activities is Rylands v. Fletcher in 1868.  Defendant 
Fletcher occupied land near a coal mine which was 
operated by the plaintiff Rylands. Several of the coal 
seams extended to Fletcher's land. Fletcher did not 
notice the seams because they were under his land, 
and Rylands totally forgot about these coal seams 
since they had been previously worked on and once 
the work was done, the tunnels and shafts had been 
cut off. Fletcher employed a third person to build a 
reservoir on his land to provide water for his mill. 
During the construction, the third person discovered 
the seams under Fletcher's land, but he did not 
inform Fletcher nor did he block up the shafts. When 
75 Wang Xuetang, Cong Yiqi Anli Tan Gongping Zeren Yuanze de Cunzai Biyaoxing [the Necessary Existence of Equitable Liability Standard-
Learning from a Case], http://www.dffy.com/sifashijian/sw/200512/20051225212652.htm, Dec 25th, 2005, last visit on Jan 25th, 2008.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 547-48 (West, 5th ed. 1984).
80 Reasons for bringing strict liability standard to environmental tort cases will be discussed in detail in the next subtitle.
81 See Guido Calabresi and Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L.J. 1055-60 (1972).
82 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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the reservoir was filled with water, the water passed 
through the shafts beneath and flooded Rylands' 
coal mine and caused damage. Rylands sued on 
the grounds of Fletcher's negligence. Fletcher 
succeeded in the Court of Exchequer and Rylands 
appealed to the Exchequer Chamber. Eventually 
the case went to the House of Lords and Fletcher 
was held liable for the damage. The issue in this 
case was whether an occupier who keeps a 
potentially dangerous substance only needs to take 
reasonable care. Lord Blackburn J., who delivered 
the judgment of the court said, “the person who for 
his own purpose brings on his land […] anything 
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his 
peril and is prima facie answerable for all the 
damage which is the natural consequence of its 
83escape.”  Lord Cairns added to the rule that it only 
applied to a “non-natural” use of the land. 
The decision in this landmark case created a       
new standard. The word “natural” has since been 
extended to mean “ordinary”, and “abnormally 
dangerous” has been divided into the group of “non-
84natural”.  The rule in this case is the most-often 
quoted example of strict liability. Moreover, ever 
since this case, more other activities that result in 
environmental damages have also been the subject 
of strict liability standard.
Generally speaking, when a strict liability standard 
is imposed, activities must pose significant 
foreseeable risk even when reasonable care is 
exercised. Detailed requirements of this cause of 
action may vary across jurisdictions. For instance, 
in some jurisdictions, the activity must not be a 
matter of common usage, but in others, common 
85usage definitely is not an absolute requirement.
In civil law countries, similar changes in liability 
criteria also occurred, although almost a century 
after changes in common law countries. In 
Germany, for example, prior to the effective date of 
the Environmental Liability Act 1991, a plaintiff 
always had to establish fault under the Civil Code 
with respect to any damage or injury caused by 
pollution. Before the introduction of Environmental 
Liability Act 1991, the strict liability standard only 
existed in very limited areas, such as mining, 
nuclear reactors, and other similar industries that 
are likely to release hazardous substances into the 
86environment. It was not until the Sandoz fire  in 
1986 which caused transboundary pollution of the 
Rhine from Basle in Switzerland to Rotterdam in the 
Netherlands did the German government realize 
the severity of modern environmental pollution and 
the necessity of the strict liability standard, not just 
the most harmful. This eventually resulted in the 
broad application of strict liability standard in 
87environmental tort in Germany.
In the aspect of international conventions and 
treaties, although various standards may be    
88found in the environmental tort regimes,  the strict 
liability standard is increasingly preferred in current 
international practice. The Convention of the 
Council of Europe on Civil Liability for Damage 
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
89Environment is a good illustration of trend.  Indeed, 
many experts commented that this trend should be 
encouraged because “given the difficult burden      
of proof to establish fault and its subjective 
intentionality, it is only natural that the fault-based    
is being increasingly questioned in the context of 
90environmental damage.”
83 Id.
84 Cao Mingde, Huanjing Qinquanfa [Environmental Tort Law] 149, the Legal Press (2000).
85 See Cities Serv. Co. v. Florida, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1975). In this case, the court imposed strict liability for damage caused by slime 
reservoir, even though the reservoir seemed to be common in Florida.
86 http://www.chinaenvironment.com/view/ViewNews.aspx?t=News_1&k=19861101161300734
87 Specific provisions relating to strict liability standard are provided in Section Ⅲ.
88 Patricia W. Birnie & Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 139-48 (1992).
89 Council of Europe, Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228 
(1993).
90 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Final Report Prepared for the Eighth Committee of the Institute of International Law by the Rapporteur on the 
Subject of Environmental Responsibility and Liability, at 286, 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 279.
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1.3.4.4. Reasons for the change of liability 
standards
The change from fault-based liability to a strict 
liability standard is occurring relatively quickly in the 
environmental tort regime compared to that in 
traditional torts. The reasons are as follows:
a. The limitation of Modern Science and Technology
The existing achievement of science and 
technology cannot help people precisely predict all 
kinds of environmental pollution and totally keep 
away from property damages or personal injuries 
caused by the pollution. The sources of pollution   
are mostly from modern enterprises who engage    
in highly dangerous activities. Even if these 
enterprises scrupulously follow the specific 
measures specially designed for them; and even if 
these enterprises have no fault in the pollutions, 
they are still highly likely to cause serious damages 
or injuries to people. If courts apply a fault-based 
liability standard, it is impossible to provide valid 
remedies to those victims suffering in the pollutions.
b.  The Characteristic of Environmental Tort
As indicated above, environmental tort produces 
subtle harm. In most circumstances, victims can 
neither prove what the polluters exactly discharge 
nor the causal connection between the discharge 
and the harm; sometimes, they are even not able to 
identify the polluters, let alone their subjective 
intentionality. Additionally, the majority of victims are 
ordinary city residents and peasants who are less 
likely to be equipped with knowledge of science and 
technology. If fault-based liability is still applied, 
then victims have the burden to prove defendants' 
fault in the environmental damage. This often 
serves to deprive those victims of their 
environmental rights. Meanwhile, such a liability 
standard encourages polluters, and leads to more 
serious damages.
c.  The Essence of Strict Liability Standard
The nature of strict liability standard lies in the 
91theory of “reasonable share of calamity”.  In some 
sense, the profits obtained by the enterprises who 
have caused environmental pollutions are 
established on the basis of polluting the 
environment and bringing damages to other people. 
Thus, they should not only be responsible for the 
fault but also for the risk of the activities they are 
involved in. At the same time, compared to the 
victims, enterprises have an advantage in the 
economy, and they usually pass their liabilities to 
the society through price and insurance. Therefore, 
potential victims' interest is protected and 
meanwhile operators do not bear a huge burden. 
This seems like a win-win solution. It corresponds 
with the soul of civil law-fairness.
d.  The Consciousness of Responsibility
Another purpose of applying strict liability is to 
enhance the enterprises' consciousness of 
responsibility, to urge them to give full attention to 
their activities, and to spur them to use the most 
updated techniques and devices to prevent the 
environmental pollutions.
1.3.4.5. Concerns about using strict liability 
standards in environmental torts
Although according to the above discussions, the 
strict liability standard does offer a relatively solid 
ground to build an effective environmental tort 
regime, it does not necessarily mean that such an 
objective standard is definitely free from legal 
92difficulties and criticism.  
Some say that strict liability results in more law 
93suits.  In environmental torts, defendants usually 
have an information advantage compared to the 
courts and plaintiffs. It may cost a lot of time and 
91 Lun Wuguocuo Zeren Yuanze [A Discussion on Strict Liability Standard], Falv kuaiche, www. Lawtime.cn,
 http://sunhai.lawtime.cn/shzhishi/2006102041039_3.html
92 W. J. Ovwerkerk, Environmental Liability from the Perspective of an Operator: Council of Europe Draft convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, in Transnational Environmental Liability and Insurance 85-9 (Kroner ed., 1993).
93 See William M. Landers and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 64-6 (Harvard, 1987).
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money to gather enough information in order to 
balance the benefits between the two parties. By 
using a strict liability standard, information costs 
certainly will decrease. However, it simultaneously 
leads to the increase of the number of claims. Since 
the “obstacle” is no longer there, courts would be 
buried in environmental tort cases, many of which 
may be only with regard to insignificant damages.
Some also argue that strict liability may cause over-
94deterrence to certain businesses.  The reason for 
this is that sometimes defendants have no idea that 
their products or activities are possible to cause 
environmental damages; and the application of 
strict liability standard totally excludes their defense 
of foreseeability. It is unfair to these people 
especially when they have already done a 
comprehensive research on their products or 
activities they engage in, and no risk has been 
predicted. Such over-deterrence is likely to result in 
excessive costs and financial burdens to the 
defendants most of whom are entrepreneurs and 
contribute a lot to the national economy. It might 
discourage them from investments and cause 
economic retrogression.
Admittedly, generalizing the use of strict liability 
would lead to rise of the claim cost and over-
deterrence to defendants. Nonetheless, compared 
to the cost of environmental damages, these 
disadvantages seem to be tolerable. Protecting the 
environment is always the priority and every 
environmental toxin should be considered 
abnormally dangerous and worthy of strict liability 
standard. Meanwhile, certain measures may be 
taken to reduce the burden on the defendants and 
claim costs, and to help strict liability standard work 
better in the environmental tort regime.
1.3.5. Defense Against Environmental Civil 
Liability
Strict liability provides room for certain defenses. 
Otherwise, it would “lose its corrective functions  
95and become a purely distributional device.”  
However, if the scope for defenses is too great, the 
characteristics of strict liability would be watered 
down and the strict liability standard would be no 
different than the fault-based liability standard. Most 
defenses used in environmental torts are similar to 
those in traditional torts. Additionally, some new 
exemptions from environmental civil liability are 
becoming popular even though some of them are 
quite controversial.
1.3.5.1.  Conventional defenses
As stated above, defenses against liability in 
traditional torts also fit in the scope of environmental 
torts. These defenses can be divided into the 
following categories: force majeure, injured party's 
own fault, and third party fault.
a.  Force Majeure
Force majeure is a French word meaning “a 
superior force” or “greater force.” It refers to “an 
event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor 
96controlled.”  It essentially frees one or both parties 
from liability when an extraordinary event or 
circumstances beyond the control of the parties 
occurs and causes personal injuries or property 
damages. The term “Force majeure” includes both 
acts of nature, such as flooding, earthquake, 
volcano, and acts of people, such as war, strike, riot, 
and crime.
94 See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A. 2d 539, 540 (N.J. 1982).
95 Mark Wilde, Civil Liability for Environmental Damage, A Comparative Analysis of Law and Policy in Europe and the United States 231, Kluwer 
Law International (2002).
96 Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), force majeure.
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Many common law countries and civil law countries 
allow defendants to invoke force majeure as a 
defense to liability as long as it has a causal 
97connection with the environmental tort.  In modern 
international practice, exemptions based on   
armed conflict, terrorism or a natural disaster of an 
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, 
have often been accepted in environmental regimes 
98and other liability arrangements.  However, such 
exemptions require comprehensive drafting since 
they often relate to additional issues. For example, 
with respect to war, it has been noted that only the 
victims should be entitled to use this event as a 
defense against liabilities for the environmental 
damages. Then, what also needs to point out in the 
conventions is how to define a victim and an 
aggressor. At least, it has to be coherent with other 
international conventions that have already given a 
99definition to “victim” and “aggressor” in a war.
b.  Injured Party's Own Fault
Injured party's own fault can be further divided into 
injured party's intention and contributory 
negligence. In the theory of injured party's intention, 
if the injured party intentionally exposed himself to 
the hazardous substances produced by the 
defendant, the defendant would be held not liable 
for the injury and compensation would be denied. 
For instance, Mr. P learned from a notice on a 
newspaper that one of the rivers in town had been 
polluted by a garbage disposal plant Co. D, and the 
water was no longer safe for use. Nonetheless, he 
still went fishing in that river, and cooked and ate the 
fish he caught. In the end, he got sick. Mr. P brings a 
lawsuit against Co. D asking for compensation for 
his injury. Court will not order Co. D to compensate 
Mr. P since he intentionally injured himself in the 
environmental pollution. Of course, Co. D is liable 
for the water pollution, but this is different from being 
liable for Mr. P's sickness. 
With respect to contributory negligence, if the 
plaintiff contributed to the damage by his 
negligence, compensation may either be reduced 
100or denied altogether.  This defense has been 
codified in some countries' environmental statutes, 
such as in German Environmental Liability. On the 
other hand, some legal experts reject contributory 
negligence as a full exemption from environmental 
tort liabilities, arguing that it can only be used for a 
101partial reduction of liabilities.  In China, only the 
Water Pollution Prevention Act has mentioned that 
contributory negligence can be used as a partial 
exemption, while other environmental statutes and 
regulations make no such allowances.
c.  Third-Party Fault
If an environmental tortfeasor successfully defends 
himself based on third-party fault, he may either get 
a full exemption or a partial reduction of liabilities. 
There are different requirements of proof in different 
countries or international conventions. Take China 
for example, in its Marine Environment Protection 
Act, article 90 says that “if pollution is caused solely 
by the third party, either intentionally or negligently, 
the third party is liable for the damage and 
102compensation.”  Article 55 (3) in China's Water 
Pollution Protection Act also provides a similar 
103regulation.  The European Commission's proposal 
of a Community Directive concerning Civil Liability 
for Damage Caused by Waste of September 1, 
1989 provides that the environmental tortfeasor 
97 Patrick Thieffry, Environmental Liability in Europe: the European Union's Projects and the Convention of the Council of Europe 1087, 28 Int'l Law. 
1083 (1994).
98 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Final Report Prepared for the Eighth Committee of the Institute of International Law by the Rapporteur on the Subject 
of Environmental Responsibility and Liability 296, 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 279.
99 This point will be fully discussed in Section III.
100 Patrick Thieffry, Environmental Liability in Europe: the European Union's Projects and the Convention of the Council of Europe 1087, 28 Int'l 
Law. 1083 (1994).
101 Huanjingfa Yuanli [Principles of Environmental Law] 193, Fudan Press, ( Lv Zhongmei ed., 1st ed., 2007).
102 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haiyang Huanjing Baohu Fa (1999 Xiuding), [Marine Environment Protection Law of People's Republic of China 
(revised in 1999)]. Zhongguo Fayuan Wang,  http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=34197
103 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shui Wuran Fangzhi Fa (1996 Xiuding), [Water Protection Act of People's Republic of China (revised in 1996)], 
Zhongguo Wang, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/huanjing/75543.htm.
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shall not be liable for the damage if he is able to 
prove that “in the absence of fault on his part, the 
damage to the environment is the result of an act or 
omission of a third party that intentionally caused 
104the damage.”   Later in 1993, the Convention on 
Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment exonerates the 
polluter of all liabilities if he is able to prove that “the 
damage was caused by a third party acting with the 
intent to cause damage, despite safety measures 
appropriate to the type of dangerous activity in 
105question.”
1.3.5.2. Other defenses used in environmental 
torts
A number of other situations have also been 
included on occasion as defenses.
a.  Self-defense
The word “self-defense” is usually used in criminal 
law. It refers to the use of force to protect oneself from 
106a real or threatened attack.  Generally, a person is 
justified in using a reasonable amount of force in self-
defense if he or she believes that bodily harm is 
imminent and that force is necessary to avoid this 
107harm.  In many countries in the world, the 
justification is extended to include the defense of 
other persons or of one's property. This concept has 
shown up for a few times as a defense against 
liabilities for environmental damages. But until now, it 
is still quite controversial to introduce this concept to 
the environmental tort regime. Some scholars think it 
difficult to set up a clear boundary to what is self-
defense, while some professionals hold the opinion 
that to some extent, it might be an effective way to 
108help reduce possibilities of environmental pollution.
b.  Regulatory Compliance Defense
A more controversial issue concerns whether a 
defense should be available when the polluter     
has carried out an activity in compliance with a 
specific order or compulsory measure from a public 
authority or from a license. In other words, could the 
existence of such reasons be regarded as a form of 
statutory authority? The answer provided by some 
countries is “No”. There is a well-known case 
109decided by Austrian Supreme Court.  In the case, 
the court awarded the plaintiffs compensation for 
the damage to the paintwork of their cars, which was 
caused by emissions of iron oxide dust from the 
defendant's facility that had been licensed since 
1979. The court's holding was famous because it 
said that the defendant could not escape liability 
simply by relying upon the fact that it had held a 
license for 15 years. In the opposite way, some 
international conventions appear positive to include 
this specific regulatory compliance defense. Article 
8 of Convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment provides exemptions for the above 
110defenses.  Either side seems to have strong points 
to support its decision. This will be further discussed 
in Section III.
c.  The Development Risk Defense
In environmental tort cases, sometimes a defendant 
might argue that particular toxins could not have been 
discovered based on the current state of science and 
technology at the time the harm occurred. This raises 
the issue of whether a “development risk” defense 
should be accepted. This issue is even more 
complex, since it is hard to define “current state”. 
Does the defense still work if the scientific knowledge 
104 Proposed Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, COM (89) 282 final, modified by Amended Proposal for a Council Directive 
COM (91)219. (1991).
105 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, art. 8(b). Lugano, June 21, 1993, Europ. T.S. 
150, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1230 (1993).
106 Bryan A. Garner, a Handbook of Basic Law Terms, West Group (1999).
107 Id.
108 See Cao Mingde, Huanjing Qinquanfa [Environmental Tort Law], the Legal Press (2000).
109 Mark Wilde, Civil Liability for Environmental Damage, A Comparative Analysis of Law and Policy in Europe and      the United States 223, 
Kluwer Law International (2002)
110 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, art. 8(b). Lugano, June 21, 1993, Europ. T.S. 
150, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1230 (1993).
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exists somewhere but is not popular? When can a 
defendant exhausts its scientific research efforts in 
order to be judged to have taken enough safety 
measures? There is no doubt that this defense leaves 
much room to be regulated.
As a matter of fact, what kind of defense is allowed 
in environmental tort is not an issue of vital 
importance, as long as that defense strikes a 
balance between the distributional and corrective 
functions of tort. In any case, defenses for 
exemptions and reduction of liabilities must be 
considered in a very restrictive perspective since 
they may end up depriving the liability scheme of all 
its significance.
d.  Statutory Prohibition
Statutory prohibition refers to the situation where a 
statute has expressly prohibited an environmental 
tort claim that might have otherwise existed in the 
common law. For example, in the U.S., some states 
have passed “Right to Farm” laws, which gave 
farmers immunity from any future nuisance suits 
against farms based on excessive air pollution, 
noxious odors, and etc.
e.  Regulatory Preemption
Regulatory preemption is an addit ional 
complicating defense where a federal statute that 
creates a regulatory system, rather than a common 
law system, is found to have preempted state 
common law tort claims. This issue has arisen in   
the U.S. in the context of pesticide regulation, with      
the federal government in certain situations arguing 
that the Federal Fungicides, Insecticides, and 
Rodenticides Act have removed certain state 
common law liabilities.
1.3.6. Remedies for environmental damages
The imposition of environmental civil liability is 
generally used to serve two main functions: 
corrective justice and deterrence, while liability for 
monetary damages is the remedy most frequently 
applied to serve these functions, injunctive relief 
can also achieve the same goal.
1.3.6.1.  Monetary damages
In an overwhelming majority of environmental tort 
cases, monetary damage is the remedy applied. 
Plaintiff is entitled to both general damages, like 
pain and suffering, and special damages, such as 
some out-of-pocket expense. Monetary damages 
cover property damages and personal injuries as 
well. Cases in which the environmental tort action 
results in the victim's psychological suffering, the 
victim can also ask for compensation.
Traditionally in tort, the precondition for awarding 
monetary damages is the existence of actual harm 
to the victim. However and as noted above, the long 
latent period of some diseases dictates that 
potentially harmful environmental exposure often 
occurs considerably before any physical harm 
manifests itself. This problem brings a question to 
environmental tort: should pollution operators also 
be responsible for creating individuals' fear of 
suffering disease in the future? For instance, Ms. P 
experienced a hazardous exposure in an 
environmental pollution created by Co. D a year 
ago. Up to now, she has not suffered from any 
physical harm. But medical monitoring for potential 
diseases caused by the exposure has been        
very costly. Under this circumstance, should Co.     
D compensate Ms. P for this cost even if the 
monitoring has not revealed or will not reveal any 
injury or disease? Some scholars have proposed 
recognition of a cause of action for tortious creation 
111of risk.  Some courts have relaxed the traditional 
restrictions and permitted such recovery under 
112limited circumstances.
1.3.6.2.  Injunctive relief
There are many types of injunctive relief in torts, but 
the three most often used in environmental torts are 
stopping the nuisance, eliminating the danger, and 
111 See Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. Legal Stud. 779 (1985).
112 Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental Regulation: An Analytical Overview, 41 Washburn L.J. 379.
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restoring the environment to its former state. In 
some cases, they are used separately, while in 
some cases, they work together. Injunctions have 
been proven to be very effective and efficient as 
remedies in the environmental tort regime because 
they force the polluters to investigate cleaner 
technologies.
1.3.7. Standing Requirements and Statutory 
Limitations
1.3.7.1.  Standing requirements
When the word “standing” is used as a legal term,    
it means “a party's right to make a legal claim or              
113 seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” In 
traditional torts, only those who have suffered some 
form of loss, such as personal injury or property 
damage, or an interference with the rights and 
benefits which flow from an interest in land have the 
right to sue. In environmental torts, a similar 
requirement applies. Generally speaking, standing 
to sue is restricted to individual who has suffered 
114 harm of the sort traditionally redressed by tort law.
Then, there appears to be a serious defect. As  
there is no guarantee that the individual who has the 
right to sue would choose to pursue the matter, it is 
not an effective way to protect the environment. For 
instance, Mr. P owns an area of waste land. For 
quite a few years, he had no interest in the property 
since he did not feel like developing it. During this 
time, the land turned out to be an unofficial waste 
yard which had all kinds of polluting substances   
and toxins. The probable outcome would be Mr. P 
leaves the land as it is and the garbage keeps 
polluting the environment. Moreover, even if Mr. P 
finally chooses to bring a lawsuit, he may lack the 
necessary resources.
In order to minimize the negative impact of such 
standing requirements, some countries, like the 
U.S., extend to right to sue to non-governmental 
organizations, such as nonofficial environmental 
protection groups. Whereas many countries still 
limit the right to individuals and seem to have not 
ever considered extending standing in this manner. 
What is worth mentioning is that even with the 
existence of organizational standing, environmental 
groups do not have unlimited capacity to sue in the 
states. Even though environmental groups do have 
the ability to sue, at least one of the members needs 
to have standing to sue in order to raise the suit. 
1.3.7.2.  Statute of limitations
The term “statute of limitations” refers to “a statute 
establishing a time limit for suing or for prosecuting 
a crime, based on the date when the claim 
115accrues.”  One of the purposes in setting a time 
limitation is to ensure that claims will be resolved 
while evidence is reasonably available and fresh. 
People tend to think that the longer the statutory 
limitation is, the less possible it is that the evidence 
is available and fresh. However, in environmental 
torts, this rule may not work well. Because of some 
of the special features shown by environmental tort 
discussed under subtitle B, it is not a bad idea to 
extend the statutory limitation in these cases.
Right now in most countries around the world, the 
time limitation is three years from the date on which 
the plaintiff knew or should have known of the 
damage suffered from the environmental pollution. 
Nevertheless, in some cases plaintiffs are likely to 
have trouble realizing the diseases they get from the 
pollution because of the long incubation period of 
the diseases. Even if they have realized the harm, 
they may have difficultities locating the source or the 
identity of the operator. How to solve this problem is 
also a “hot” issue.
From the brief overview of environmental civil 
liability, we may conclude that its distinctions from 
traditional tort have left many issues unsolved. If 
they are handled well, environmental damages may 
be effectively reduced and the right of individuals 
suffering from environmental pollutions will be well 
protected; if not, operators will keep polluting the 
113 Bryan A. Garner, a Handbook of Basic Law Terms, at 204, West Group (1999).
114 See Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 55 (1989).
115 Bryan A. Garner, a Handbook of Basic Law Terms, at 206, West Group (1999).
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environment, and bringing disasters to human 
beings remaining beyond the arm of civil liability.
2. ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL LIABILITY 
REGIMES IN THE U.S AND E.U
Compared with traditional tort, environmental tort 
has many different features which challenge and 
expand upon traditional tort theory. Thus, it would be 
inappropriate to simply borrow and apply outdated, 
traditional tort analysis to environmental tort cases. 
Both common law and civil law countries have made 
and are making environmental laws and policies 
based on the individual circumstances existing in 
each country. In addition, since a large quantity of 
environmental pollution is transboundary, many 
countries around the world have established 
international or regional conventions with regard to 
environmental civil liabilities. To assess the wide-
ranging approaches to environmental tort, this 
section will compare the environmental civil liability 
regimes in the U.S, and in the European Union.
2.1. Environmental Civil liability System in          
the U.S.
In the U.S, common law notions of tort theory as well 
as statutes and regulations establish civil liability for 
environmental damages. Generally speaking, any 
common law tort cause of action for physical injuries 
and property damages is potentially available in 
environmental tort actions. Statutory causes of 
action for the cost of environmental remediation are 
often available under statutes created by federal 
and state legislatures.
2.1.1. Environmental civil liabilities under 
common law
a. Trespass and Nuisance
The theory of trespass aims to protect an 
individual's right of to possess land. Recovery for 
monetary damages is available for actual physical 
invasions of property. Nuisance actions, like 
trespass actions, relate to individual rights of land 
possession, but extend these rights further, 
protecting the right to use or enjoyment of land. 
Nuisance theory traditionally provides remedies for 
a non-possessory interference like pollution, which 
is actionable for either personal injuries or property 
116damages.  
Common law nuisances are divided into public 
nuisances and private nuisances. The former 
affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of 
a class of subjects and the latter affects only 
particular individuals. Public nuisances usually 
have a wide-spread range, so it is difficult for one 
individual to demonstrate public nuisance as a 
cause of action; the entire community suffering  
from the public nuisance should take on the 
responsibility. Private nuisance claims are 
somewhat more complicated. Unlike public 
nuisance actions, statutory authority and 
prescriptive right are effective defenses to claims   
of private nuisance.
One of the important elements to establish nuisance 
is that the interference with the plaintiff's interest   
117has to be unreasonable.  However, unreasonable 
interference differs from unreasonable conduct. In 
some cases, even if the conduct is reasonable,     
the polluter is liable if the conduct constitutes a 
substantial unreasonable interference. When 
making a determination about whether or not the 
unreasonableness exists, courts take into account 
factors such as the location of the setting, the burden 
118on the plaintiff and the history of that land use.  To 
illustrate the analysis of these factors, consider two 
instances of air pollution of the same degree. One is 
in an industrialized neighborhood, while the other is 
in a rural area with no manufactu-ring history. The 
operator in the rural area is more likely to be held 
liable for nuisance because the courts would 
probably consider the location of  the setting and the 
history of the land use as a significant factor in the 
reasonableness of the pollution.
116 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts §13 (5th ed. 1984).
117 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts §87 (5th ed. 1984).
118 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts §88 (5th ed. 1984).
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b.  Negligence
Negligence is “the failure to exercise the standard of 
care that a reasonably prudent person would have 
119exercised in the same situation.”  A cause of action 
for negligence is also potentially available in claims 
for environmental harm. Traditionally, proving 
negligence for environmental damages requires a 
plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) the polluter owed 
him a duty of care; (2) the polluter breached the 
standard of care imposed by that duty; (3) the harm 
that occurred was caused by the breach of the          
duty; and (4) it was a reasonably foreseeable 
120consequence of the breach of duty.  
Because of the characteristics of environmental tort 
actions discussed in section II, such as difficulty 
determining polluters, unequal status of victims and 
operators, problems of identifying the injury and so 
forth, it is usually not easy for a claimant to prove 
elements of duty of care, damages and causation. 
To satisfy the foreseeability requirement, a claimant 
must prove that at the time of the tortious conduct, 
the operator knew or should have known of the risk 
that his conduct could cause environmental harm. 
In a few claims, this is feasible. However, this is not 
always the case. Due to the long-term latency of 
many environmental torts, it often takes a while 
before the harm at issue materializes. Before 
manifestation of the harm, it is not possible to 
establish the causal link between the defendant's 
conduct and the environmental damages, not to 
mention the defendant's ability to foresee the risk. 
Compared to the requirements set in a negligence 
case, the negligence per se doctrine, as codified in 
U.S statutes and regulations, treats the requirement 
of foreseeability in a flexible manner. In most 
jurisdictions in the U.S, the unexcused violation of 
an applicable statute or regulation is negligence as 
121a matter of law.  The cause of action is complete 
once a polluter violates the statutes or regulations, 
as the polluter essentially harms the same class of 
122people protected by those laws.  Foreseeability is 
no longer an element that needs to be met under 
this circumstance.
c.  Strict Liability
Strict liability may be imposed for personal injuries 
or property damages caused by “extremely 
123dangerous” activities.   As discussed in section II, 
it was in the English common law case Rylands v. 
Fletcher was established. In that case, the courts 
said that building and occupying a reservoir is an 
abnormally dangerous activity. In the U.S, the range 
of abnormally dangerous activity has been greatly 
expanded, and thus, many activities resulting in 
environmental harm have fallen into the scope of 
abnormally dangerous activities and become the 
subject of claims for strict liability. 
In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., et 
al., defendant, a waste disposal company, injected 
hazardous chemical waste into an oil pipeline, 
124causing a fire and explosion.  In the explosion 
plaintiff's refinery was badly damaged. Plaintiff  
sued defendant for disguising the industrial waste 
as a benign oil product and expelling it into the oil 
125pipeline, thereby affecting interstate commerce.  
The trial court held that defendant was liable for     
its intentional involvement in an extremely 
dangerous activity under the theory of strict 
126liability.  The United States Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and           
agreed that the disposal of waste by introducing it 
127into the oil pipeline was abnormally dangerous.
In a similar state case, Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor 
Alkali Company Inc, the Supreme Court of Nevada 
119 Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)
120 David Hughes, Environmental Law 61 (2d ed. 1992).
121 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort Law (1977).
122 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort Law (1977).
123 See Restatement (Third) of Torts, Chapter 4 Strict Liability §20 (2005).
124 Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., et al., 678 F. 2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1982).
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id.
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adopted the doctrine of strict liability for the            
128release of liquefied chlorine into the environment.  
It held that the operation of a facility engaged in           
the manufacture, storage, and control of liquefied 
chlorine and chlorine gas, constituted an 
129abnormally dangerous activity.  As to the question 
how to decide that an activity involving chlorine is 
necessarily an “abnormally dangerous activity”, 
judges highly recommended the approach taken in 
Erbrich Prod. Co., Inc. v. Wills, 509 N.E. 2d 850 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1987). In the court's opinion, judges cited 
from Erbrich:
We of course recognize that chlorine gas, in     
its natural state, is dangerous. However, the  
fact that chlorine gas is dangerous is not 
determinative. When deciding whether to 
impose [strict] liability, we must not look at the 
abstract propensities or properties of the 
particular substance involved, but must analyze 
the defendant's activity as a whole. If the rule 
were otherwise, virtually any commercial or 
industrial activity involving substances which 
are dangerous only in the abstract automatically 
would be deemed as abnormally dangerous. 
130This result would be intolerable.
This case has a significant impact even although     it 
is not as seminal as Rylands v. Fletcher since it 
primarily expounds upon the principles first 
established in Erbrich. Before Erbrich, to determine 
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous and 
whether strict liability should be imposed upon a 
defendant, six factors had to be satisfied: (1) 
existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to 
the person, land or chattels of others; (2) likelihood 
that the harm that results from it will be great; (3) 
inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of 
reasonable care; (4) extent to which the activity is not 
a matter of common usage; (5) inappropriateness of 
the activity to the place where it is carries on; and (6) 
extent to which its value to the community is 
131outweighed by its dangerous attributes.  These 
factors were rather vague and needed to be more 
fact specific. The Supreme Court of Nevada helped 
to bring more specificity to the rules.
In Caporale, the Nevada Supreme Court held that 
the maintenance of a strict liability claim requires 
proof of three factors: (1) an instrumentality capable 
of producing harm; (2) circumstances and condition 
in its use which, irrespective of a lawful purpose     
or due care; (3) and a causal relation between the 
activity and the injury for which damages are 
132claimed.  In addition, a person who uses an 
intrinsically dangerous means to accomplish a 
lawful end, in such a way as will necessarily or 
obviously expose the person of another to the 
danger of probable injury, faces liability if injury 
133results, even though he uses all proper care.  
Based on the above rules, the United States   
District Court for the District of Connecticut held in 
Albahary v. City & Town of Bristol, that city landfill 
134contamination was the subject of strict liability.  In 
this case, plaintiff owned a parcel of land adjacent to 
the landfill operated by the town of Bristol. 
135 Defendant did not manage the landfill properly.
The defendant allowed hazardous wastes and toxic 
substances to be dumped into the landfill, which 
resulted in the pollution and contamination of the 
136soil, ground and water beneath plaintiff's land.  
Plaintiff claimed that his land had been “rendered 
undevelopable and had substantially declined in 
value because the contamination of the land's 
groundwater deprives it of its only source of potable 
137drinking water.”  Judge Janet Bond Arterton 
delivered the Court's opinion that:
128  Michela D. Valentine and Jack D. Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Company Inc., 109 Nev. 1107 (1993).
129 Id. 
130 Michela D. Valentine and Jack D. Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Company Inc., 109 Nev. 1107 (1993) (citing from Erbrich Prod. Co., Inc. v. 
Wills, 509 N.E. 2d 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) at 856.)
131 Restatement (Third) of Torts, Chapter 4 Strict Liability §20 (2005).
132 Caporale v. C.W. Blakeslee and Sons, Inc., 175 A. 2d 561 (D. Conn. 1961).
133 Worth v. Dunn, 118 A. 467 (D. Conn. 1922).
134 Albahary v. City & Town of Bristol, 963 F. Supp. 150 (D. Conn. 1997).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 152.
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Because hazardous materials are an 
instrumentality capable of producing harm, and 
because the circumstances and conditions of its 
disposal into a municipal landfill, irrespective of a 
lawful purpose or due care, involve a substantial 
risk of probable injury to the person or property of 
others, the court concludes that disposal of 
hazardous and toxic wastes at a landfill may 
constitute an abnormally dangerous or ultra-
hazardous activity sufficient to maintain a cause 
of action for strict liability, and in light of plaintiff's 
allegation that defendant allowed the discharge 
into the Bristol landfill of hazardous substances, 
plaintiffs are entitled to put forth evidence of the 
extent to which disposal of hazardous materials 
was allowed and encouraged at the landfill. As 
well as the toxic nature of the hazardous wastes 
138plaintiffs allege were disposed of there.
These three cases can be regarded as the 
reflections of how the theory of strict liability is 
applied and developed in environmental damages. 
2.1.2.  Environmental Civil Liabilities under 
Statutes
Environmental civil liabilities are being regulated in 
various statutes in the U.S, such as in the Clean 
Water Act and Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA). However, these acts do not 
provide a mechanism to fund remediation for 
environmental damages. The most typical and 
famous act is the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
139(“CERCLA”), also known as the “Superfund” Act.  
Its goal is to create a system which can help to 
accomplish the remediation of sites containing 
hazardous waste that pose a threat to the 
environment or public health. Many states have 
their own “mini-Superfund”, which are quite similar 
to CERCLA, applying to sites that are not within the 
scope of the federal regime.
a.  A Brief History of CERCLA
Love Canal is a well-known name to most 
environmental lawyers in the United States, since it 
was the setting of the most highly publicized events 
of environmental pollution that the U.S. has ever 
known. In the summer of 1977, New York State 
declared a health emergency and evacuated 200 
families from their houses in the area of Love Canal, 
a dump site for hazardous chemicals which was 
located near Niagara Falls, New York. Residents in 
the Love Canal area found chemical wastes 
seeping up from the ground into their basements. A 
wide range of health effects were alleged and 
feared. The federal government had to not only 
evacuate the residents, pay them for their homes, 
but also to demolish the whole neighborhood.
In 1980, the United States filed a $ 134 million 
lawsuit against the company that had dumped tens 
of thousands of tons of chemical waste at Love 
Canal from the 1940s to 1950s. The complaint was 
140primarily based on the RCRA,  the Clean Water 
141 142Act,  and the Safe Drinking Water Act.  Later, the 
state of New York was joined as a plaintiff in the 
federal action with claims based on public and 
private nuisance and restitution. Ultimately, the 
case was settled and the federal government 
recovered $ 129 million to cover its cleanup cost. 
New York State recovered $ 98 million and the liable 
company further agreed to assume continued 
operation and maintenance of the remedial and 
monitoring facilities.
Before the incident of Love Canal, the U.S. 
Congress had already made many efforts to enact 
legislation addressing liability and compensation   
for injury to the environment from releases of 
hazardous substances. This event again convinced 
the Congress that public health and the 
environment were at peril because of the releases 
of toxins and contaminants. It became the catalyst 
138 Id. at 156.
139 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.).
140 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§6901-92.
141 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376.
142 42 U.S.C. §300.
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for serious Congressional consideration of cleanup 
legislation. On December 11, 1980, Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act. Since 
then, Congress has comprehensibly amended 
CERCLA twice. The first time was through the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
143(“SARA”) in 1986.  SARA added many provisions 
to CERCLA and clarified much of what was unclear 
in the original act. In 2002, CERCLA was amended 
again through the implementation of the Small 
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
144Revitalization Act (“Brownfields Amendments”).  
The purpose of this amendment still was to make 
the terms in CERCLA clearer. 
b.  Basic Structure of CERCLA
CERCLA was enacted to set up four fundamental 
program elements: (1) A system for information 
gathering and analysis; (2) Federal authority to 
respond to and clean up releases of hazardous 
substances; (3) A Hazardous Substance Response 
Trust Fund, which is called the “Superfund” to 
underwrite clean-up; and (4) A liability scheme for 
those responsible for releases of hazardous 
substances. Basically, there are four titles under 
CERCLA: Hazardous Substances Releases, 
Liability, Compensation; Hazardous Substance 
Response Revenue Act of 1980; Miscellaneous 
Provisions; and Pollution Insurance. Some of the 
provisions in Title One are regarded as the most 
significant ones in CERCLA. They are Section 107, 
the liability section; Section 104, which regulates 
the response authority; Section 106, which is about 
the abatement action; Section 101, the definition 
section; Section 105, the National Contingency 
Plan section; and Section 103, which gives specific 
requirements to reporting the releases of hazardous 
145substances.
c.  Key CERCLA Definitions
Based on the definitions given by CERCLA, liability 
for environmental damages can be explained as 
follows: 
The term “environment” means (A) the 
navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous 
zone, and the ocean waters of which the natural 
resources are under the exclusive management 
authority of the United States under Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976, and 
(B) any other surface water, ground water, 
drinking water supply, land surface or 
subsurface strata, or ambient air within the 
United States or under the jurisdiction of the 
146United States.
The term “damages” means damages for injury 
or loss of natural resources as set forth in 
147Section 107 (a) or 111 (b) of this Act.
The terms “liable” and “liability” under this title 
shall be construed to be the standard of liability 
which obtains under Section 311 of the Federal 
148Water Pollution Control Act.
“Facilities” is another key noun frequently appearing 
in statutes. In CERCLA, it is termed as: 
(A) any building, structure, installation, 
equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe 
into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), 
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, 
landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling 
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a 
hazardous substance has been deposited, 
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come 
to be located; but does not include any consumer 
149product in consumer use or any vessel.
143 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986).
144 Pub. L. No. 107-118, Stat. 2356 (2002).
145 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.).
146 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 101 (8).
147 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 101 (6).
148 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 101 (33).
149 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 101 (9).
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From this definition, we can conclude that the 
meaning of facilities is broad in CERCLA. Cases in 
which facilities are at issue perfectly correspond to 
this intentional expansion. For instance, in the court 
decision of United States v. Ward, “facility includes 
roadside ditches where contaminated oil was 
150spread.”  In some situations, it even transcends 
normal property boundaries. The holding in United 
States v. Taylor is definitely a good proof. It said: 
“[…] noncontiguous facilities may be treated as a 
single facility where they are reasonably related on 
the basis of geography or the actual or potential 
threat to the public health or welfare or the 
151 environment.”
“Facilities” is not the only term that is given a broad 
definition under CERCLA; “hazardous substances” 
is another one. It is statutorily defined as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to 
Section 311 (b)(2)(A) of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, (B) any element, 
compound, mixture, solution, or substance 
designated pursuant to Section 102 of this Act, 
(C) any hazardous waste having the 
characteristics identified under or listed 
pursuant to Section 3001 of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act (but not including any waste the 
regulation of which under the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act has been suspended by Act of 
Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under 
Section 307(a) of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, (E) any hazardous air pollutant 
listed under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 
and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical 
substance or mixture with respect to which the 
Administrator has taken action pursuant to 
Section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control 
152Act….
From this part, we can see that CERCLA does not 
have its own definition of “hazardous substances.” 
Instead, it simply incorporates by reference the lists 
of toxic chemicals in other federal statutes. 
Moreover, even though this provision lists some 
exclusiveness, like:
The term does not include petroleum, including 
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not 
otherwise specifically listed or designated as a 
hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) 
through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does 
not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, 
liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for 
fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such 
synthetic gas).
It is still the truth that the scope of “hazardous 
substances” is broad, and therefore, the release of 
almost any toxin to the environment can trigger the 
“Superfund.”
d.  Liable Party under CERCLA
Section 107 of the “Superfund” sets forth a liability 
allocation scheme. CERCLA imposes strict liability 
(often joint and several liability) for restitution of 
response costs incurred by the government or a 
private party as a result of actual or potential 
releases of hazardous chemicals. Four categories 
of responsible parties are liable: (1) owners and 
operators of a “facility” from which hazardous 
substances are threatened to be released or are 
actually released, (2) persons who owned or 
operated a facility at the time of hazardous 
substance disposal, (3) persons who arranged for 
disposal of hazardous substances, and (4) persons 
who transported hazardous substances and 
153selected the disposal site.  These persons are 
called potentially responsible parties (“PRP”), and 
as discussed later, their defense options are quite 
limited.
150 United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (1985).
151 United States v. Taylor, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17477 (1989).
152 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 101 (14).
153 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 107 (a).
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What is worth mentioning is that “owners and 
operators” do not include a unit of state or local 
government that acquired ownership or control 
involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, 
abandonment, or other circumstances in which the 
government involuntarily acquired title by virtue of 
154its function as the sovereign power.  The exclusion 
does not apply, however, to any state or local 
government that has caused or contributed to the 
release or threatened release of a hazardous 
155substance from the facility.  At this point, federal 
government is not so lucky as is a state or local 
government because the District of Columbia 
Circuit said in the case of East Bay Municipal Utility 
District v. United States Department of Commerce, 
that the federal government had waived sovereign 
immunity as a defense to CERCLA liability whether 
156it is acting in a proprietary or regulatory mode.
e.  Defenses
There are not many defenses to CERCLA liability, 
either statutory or equitable.
The statutory defenses are available when                     
the release or threat of release of a hazardous 
substance and the damages resulting therefrom 
were caused exclusively by (1) an act of God; (2) an 
act of war; (3) an act of unrelated third parties with 
whom a potential responsible party has no direct        
or indirect contractual connection, and where the 
potential responsible party exercises due care with 
157respect to any hazardous chemicals.
The defense most likely to be raised by a party is the 
third one, the innocent owner defenses. The 2001 
Superfund Amendments expended it even where 
purchase of property is made with knowledge of 
158contamination.  The defense based on act of God 
159has almost always failed.  Hurricanes, heavy rains 
or winds, severe storms, floods, and fires caused by 
160lightning are all foreseeable events.  And 
contamination due to these incidents was 
preventable and not the act of God. As a 
consequence, unless the act of God is the only 
cause of the contamination and entirely 
unforeseeable, a defense based on this reason will 
probably not be successfully asserted. An “act of 
war” generally implies an act of combative nature. In 
history, there has been only one successful case 
based on this defense. In 1998, United States 
brought a lawsuit against Shell Oil Company, 
pursuant to § 107 of the CERCLA, seeking to 
recover the substantial costs in its attempts to clean 
up a site. The damage to the site was the result of a 
deleterious by-product of the World War II aviation 
161gasoline program.  Having found both the United 
States and the Oil Companies liable, the United 
States District Court for the Central District of 
California needed to determine only the percentage 
of liability allocable to the Government and to the Oil 
162Companies.  After analyzing a few facts of this 
case, such as the government's uncontested 
liability; a minimum, but incomplete, estimate of the 
percentage of waste attributable to the avgas 
program; 100 percent of the non-benzol waste at 
the site was attributable to the avgas program; and 
163etc.  The court concluded that 100 percent 
allocation of liability was to the United States and 
zero percent allocation of liability to the Oil 
Companies, because “the war caused the problem 
and like myriad others the burden must rest on the 
United States, which is all of us. The United States 
won the war and all of us paid the costs at the time. 
164This is another such cost merely long delayed.”
154 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 101 (20) (D).
155 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 101 (20) (D).
156 East Bay Municipal Utility District v. United States Department of Commerce, 330 U.S. app. D. C. 31 (1998).
157 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 107 (b).
158 Steven Ferry, Environmental Law, Aspen Publishers (4th ed., 2007).
159 Carole Stern Switzer and Lynn A. Bulan, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), Section of 
Environment Energy and Resources (2002).
160 Carole Stern Switzer and Lynn A. Bulan, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), Section of 
Environment Energy and Resources (2002).
161 United States of America v. Shell Oil Company, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (U.S. Dist, 1998).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id, at 1030.
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Under the definition of an owner or operator 
provided by § 101 in CERCLA, a person who 
“without participating in the management of a vessel 
or facility, holds an indicia of ownership primarily to 
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility” is 
165excluded from liability.  This is called “the secured 
creditor exception”. However, the statute leaves an 
unclear question here: to what degree a person's 
participation in the vessel or facility reaches the 
level of “participating in the management?” In the 
following years after the enactment of CERCLA, the 
166American Environmental Protection Agency  
issued rules clarifying this exception, but got struck 
167down by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.  It was 
not until 1996, in which the Congress enacted the 
Asset Conservation Act, was a clear definition of 
168“participating in the management” set up.
Throughout CERCLA, there are another two minor 
defenses available to defendants. The de micromis 
exemption exempts generators and transporters 
from CERCLA liability when they can demonstrate 
that
(A) the total amount of the material containing 
hazardous substances that the person 
arranged for transport for disposal or 
treatment of, or accepted for transport for 
disposal or treatment, at the facility was less 
than 110 gallons of liquid materials or                
less than 200 pounds of solid materials (or 
such greater or lesser amounts as the 
Administrator may determine by regulation); 
and
(B) all or part of the disposal, treatment, or 
transport concerned occurred before April 1, 
1692001.
In order to be eligible for the exemption, the 
materials must not have significantly contributed or 
be able to significantly contribute to the cost of the 
response action, and the claimant must not have 
failed to comply with any information request or 
have impeded any response action, or have been 
convicted of a criminal violation for conduct to which 
170the exemption applies.
The other one is the Municipal Solid Waste 
exemption, which excludes from liability an owner, 
operator, or lessee of residential property; small 
businesses; and small nonprofit organizations. The 
same eligibility limitations that are applied to the de 
171micromis exemption also apply here.
Almost every defendant will raise equitable and 
other defenses in addition to the statutory defenses, 
but these defenses are rarely successful. Some 
courts have suggested that equitable defenses 
such as estoppel, unclean hands, laches, and res 
judicata may be asserted in certain situations,      
but most courts have held that available defenses 
are limited to those enumerated in CERCLA. In 
addition, other defenses such as procedural 
omissions by EPA have always failed.
f.  Strict Liability and Proximate Cause
There is no provision in CERCLA clearly saying 
whether the liability of potential responsible parties 
is based strictly on their status or whether elements 
of negligence should be considered. When 
Congress drafted CERCLA, they omitted this key 
issue. However, because CERCLA incorporates by 
reference of the Clean Water Act, whose §311 holds 
violators strictly liable for marine damages, courts 
overwhelmingly hold potential responsible parties 
strictly liable in cost recovery actions under 
CERCLA. Therefore, CERCLA is not negligence 
based but strict liability based.
Proximate cause, including actual causation, 
connects conduct and injury together. CERCLA 
165 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 101 (20) (A).
166 Hereinafter EPA.
167 Carole Stern Switzer and Lynn A. Bulan, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund), Section of 
Environment Energy and Resources (2002).
168 42 U.S.C. §9601 (20) (E)-(G), §9607 (n) and §6991b (h).
169 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 107 (o) (1) (A) and (B).
170 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 107 (o) (2).
171 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 107 (p).
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imposes proximate cause on potential responsible 
parties. Specific requirements of proximate cause 
are developed in various cases by the courts.
g.  Enforcement of CERCLA
Generally speaking, all the ways to enforce 
CERCLA fall into two categories- mechanisms 
available to the government and mechanisms 
available to the public.
The government has the power to order a cleanup 
or give injunctive remedies. Section 106 of CERCLA 
empowers EPA with “imminent hazard” authority to 
take such action “as may be necessary to protect 
public health and welfare and the environment,” 
172after the affected state is notified.  EPA may use 
either civil judicial injunctive actions or unilateral 
EPA administrative orders to act. 
EPA can also perform a cleanup and then bring a 
lawsuit to recover its costs from the potential 
responsible parties. Section 107 of CERCLA 
establishes liability for recovery of (1) costs incurred 
by state or federal governments that are not 
inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan 
(NCP), (2) any other necessary response costs 
consistent with the NCP incurred by any other 
person, and (3) “damages for injury to, destruction 
of, or loss of natural resources, including the 
173reasonable costs” for damage assessment.  
Moreover, EPA is also allowed to recover “costs 
expended for investigation, monitoring, and testing; 
response-related planning costs; EPA and Justice 
Department staff costs; and litigation and attorney 
174fees.”  Prejudgment interest also has been held to 
be a consistently recoverable response cost     
under CERCLA. However, costs related to the 
investigation of a potential responsible party, as 
opposed to investigation of the site, have been held 
to be not recoverable.
Bringing a lawsuit to court is not always a good   
idea. As a matter of fact, a large percentage of 
CERCLA matters are resolved through a negotiated 
settlement process that results in a consent decree. 
This settlement is also referred to as “friendly 
persuasion”, which means after gathering 
information from a potential responsible party, EPA 
convinced that party to take voluntary clean-up 
action. There are many possible benefits of entering 
into such a negotiation: parties who choose to settle 
have the immunity from contribution actions brought 
by nonsettling parties; the remediation costs might 
be lower; settling parties might obtain immunity 
175regarding any further liability.
Besides what has been discussed above, the 
reporting requirements set up in CERCLA are also 
effective tools. Actually, the government uses the 
reporting requirements to determine which sites to 
investigate and clean up. Section 103 requires any 
person who is in charge of a vessel or facility, as 
soon as he has knowledge of any release, except 
for a federally permitted release, of a hazardous 
substance in quantities equal to or greater than 
those determined pursuant to CERCLA §102, he 
must immediately notify the National Response 
176Center.  Together with §104 (e), which allows EPA 
to enter facilities and obtain information relating to 
potential responsible parties, hazardous substance 
releases, and liability, § 103 provides EPA with a 
very broad information- gathering authority.
The recovery mechanism available to the public 
mainly refers to the citizen suit. This is considered to 
be the most effective way of enforcement. CERCLA 
encourages individuals and organizations to help 
promote environmental compliance. Under 
CERCLA, “any person” can sue on his behalf 
against either an alleged polluter or the government 
agency that is supposed to be regulating the 
activities of that polluter. If the plaintiff wins the case, 
he or she will be awarded costs and attorney's fees. 
On the other hand, CERCLA also sets out provisions 
to avoid the citizens' abuse of this power: the plaintiff 
172 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 106.
173 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 107 (a) (4).
174 Steven Ferry, Environmental Law, Aspen Publishers (4th ed., 2007). at 381.
175 This is a statutorily created limitation of subsequent liability for settling parties. See 42 U.S.C. §9622 (f).
176 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 103 (a).
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must give notice to EPA as well as to the alleged 
polluter at least 60 days before filing the lawsuit, and 
provide sufficient information to the violator, letting 
him know what, when and where he violated. 
Further, if the government has already prosecuted a 
civil or criminal action against the defendant, a 
citizen suit is prohibited. The United States also 
preserves the right to intervene in a citizen suit.
h.  Statute of Limitations
Prior to the 1986 SARA amendments, CERCLA had 
no specific statute of limitations provisions. 
However, the amendments provide limitations 
periods for natural resource damages, cost 
recovery actions, and contribution actions.
With regard to natural resource damage, the 
limitation period for the claims is 3 years after the 
latter of either (A) “[t]he date of the discovery of     
the loss and its connection with the release in 
question” or (B) “[t]he date on which regulations are 
177 promulgated under §301 (c)”.
As to cost recovery actions, §113 g (2) has two 
limitation periods:
(A) for a removal action, within 3 years after 
completion of the removal action, except that 
such cost recovery action must be brought with 
6 years after a determination to grant a waiver 
under §104 (c)(1)(C) for continued response 
action; and
(B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after 
initiation of physical on-site construction of the 
remedial action, except that, if the remedial 
action is initiated within 3 years after the 
completion of the removal action, costs 
incurred in the removal action may be 
recovered in the cost recovery action brought 
under this subparagraph.
It also provides an extension of limitation period for 
removals when they are followed by a remedial 
178action.
As for the contribution actions for response costs or 
damages, claims must be brought no more than 3 
years after (A) the date of judgment in any action 
under this Act for recovery of such costs or 
damages, or (B) the date of an administrative order 
entry of a judicially approved settlement with 
179respect to such costs or damages.
1. Torts vs. Statutes
It has always been a huge task to develop an 
effect ive centra l  regime for  regulat ing 
environmental civil liabilities. Purely case-by-case 
approach or enacting-statutes approach has 
proven to be largely ineffectual. 
The rules in traditional tort serve deterrence and 
remediation goals poorly. In a traditional tort claim 
regarding environmental damages, based for 
example on nuisance, the plaintiff must show 
causation to recover more than nominal damages. 
Besides, he also has to prove duty of care and 
damages. To this point, there are advantages of 
bring CERCLA claims instead of common law tort 
claims. In a CERCLA claim, the plaintiff does not 
have to prove that the defendant's hazardous 
substances directly caused the environmental 
damage. Moreover, because CERCLA is a strict 
liability statute, the plaintiff does not have to prove 
that the polluter is negligent. The statute of 
limitations for CERCLA is longer after the 
defendants' actions for the plaintiff to initiate suit 
than that for common law claims.
However, this does not mean that CERCLA claims 
have no defects at all. In a CERCLA claim, plaintiff is 
unable to recover any damages other than 
response costs. This is different from a tort action, in 
which plaintiff may seek damages for diminution of 
property and emotional distress. Another defect is 
that any CERCLA claim has to be based on a 
remedial action that was performed in compliance 
with the National Contingency Plan, which 
potentially raises the cost of remediation.
177 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 113 (g) (1).
178 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 113 (g) (2).
179 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, Section 113 (g) (3).
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Tort law is primarily a vehicle for reparation and cure 
rather than punishment while CERCLA regime 
focuses on remediation and prevention. They both 
have advantages and disadvantages. It is hard to 
conclude which one works better for the 
environmental civil liability regime. Nowadays in the 
U.S., although the statutes do not impose liability for 
personal injury, it is common for private tort actions 
to parallel CERCLA and state cleanup actions, and 
to base their claims at least in part on the same core 
facts as these actions. Indeed, frequently it is the 
discovery of offsite drinking water contamination or 
personal injury that prompts the initiation of federal 
or state cleanup action.
2.2. Environmental Civil Liability Regime in 
the European Union
The European Union (EU) was created under the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The predecessor of the 
EU was the European Community (EC), an 
independent supranational economic organization 
founded by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The EC is 
currently one of the three pillars of EU, and will be 
completely absorbed by EU in 2009 if the Treaty of 
180Lisbon comes into force.  During the EC era, there 
was no environmental policy at all. However, once 
the member states realized the importance of an 
environmental liability regime, the Commission of 
the EC (now EU) drafted a variety of proposals and 
made great progress in this field.
2.2.1. Reasons for EU to intervene into 
Environmental Civil Liability
The main objective of the EC was to promote 
economic expansion in order to bring about 
increased prosperity, employment and better 
housing in the post-World War II era. People were 
eagerly looking forward to a lasting peace in Europe 
with a stable social and economic condition. 
However, at that time, attention was focused on how 
to improve the economy with little appreciation for 
environmental policies.
The awareness that focusing solely on economic 
development at the expense of environmental 
protection could cost heavy a price generally came 
from Rachel Carson's book, Silent Spring.  This 
book documented the negative effects of pesticides 
on the environment, especially on birds. The abuse 
of DDT in agriculture caused thinner egg shells and 
reproductive problems. As a result, the number of 
birds was sharply decreasing. The author was 
concerned that if such a situation continued, it would 
literally result in a “Silent Spring”. The book also 
strictly criticized the chemical industry of spreading 
disinformation and public officials of accepting 
181industry claims uncritically.  
Environmental disasters that occurred subse-
quently, either inside EU member-states or outside 
Europe, such as the 1967 Torrey Canyon and the 
1976 Seveso's TCDD incidents, finally raised public 
consciousness of environmental issues. From 
these environmental pollutions, the Commission 
realized that in modern times, environmental 
problems are usually transboundary. This nature 
indicates that an environmental civil liability regime 
that works in EU-wide may be more effective than 
unilateral and separate regimes in different member 
states.
Not only the ecological need that created the 
political climate necessary for establishing a 
centralized environmental liability regime, there are 
also economic desires for a standard playing field 
for competition within internal markets. This resulted 
from the various restrictions on polluting activities 
set up by individual countries. Sometimes the 
variation of these restrictions raised business costs, 
interfered with the ability of certain member states to 
import and export, and disadvantaged them in the 
EU's internal market.
180 European Community, from Wikipedia. http://gollum.easycp.de/gollum/gollum.php?a=core&l=zh-cn&wl=en&q=.
181 Silent Spring, from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silent_Spring.
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2.2.2. EU's Developments on Civil Liability for 
Environmental Damage
a. The Fifth Environmental Action Program
It was the Sandoz incident that called upon the EU 
commission's immediate response. There was a 
catastrophic fire at a chemicals factory near Basel, 
Switzerland in 1986, sending tons of toxic 
chemicals into the nearby river Rhine and turning it 
red. The fire broke out in a storage building used for 
pesticides, mercury and other highly poisonous 
agricultural chemicals. Firefighters spent hours 
extinguishing the fire. But the chemicals were also 
washed into the river with the water used by 
firefighters to tackle the fire. About 30 tons of 
pesticides were discharged into the river, Western 
Europe's most important waterway. Four countries 
which the river flows through - Switzerland, 
Germany, France and Holland-had to sound a siren 
to alert people to stay indoors and stay away from 
182the river.  To prevent such environmental disasters 
from occurring again and to provide remedies to the 
environmental damages, EU brought out a new 
approach that focused on the possible use of civil 
th liability. This new measure was provided in EU's 5
Environmental Action Program, which says:
An integrated Community approach to environ-
mental liability will be established to make sure 
that, if damage to the environment does occur, it 
is properly remedied through restoration. 
Liability will be an essential tool of last resort to 
punish despoliation of the environment. In 
addition - and in line with the objective of 
prevention at source - it will provide a very clear 
economic incentive for management and control 
183of risk, pollution and waste.
b.  Proposals on Civil Liability for Damage Caused 
by Waste 
EU developed a sector specific response starting 
with the wastes. In 1989, a formal proposal on Civil 
Liability for Damage caused by waste was 
published in the form of a draft Directive. In this 
proposal, a strict liability regime was established. 
Two years later, a more comprehensive proposal 
was published again to replace the 1989 
184Directive.  The significance of the 1991 Waste 
Proposal lies in the statutory limitations. Article 10 
included a 30 year statute of limitations during which 
time an action can be brought so as to deal with one 
of the features of modern environmental pollutions- 
the long latency before the damage could be 
detected. Once environmental harm has been 
discovered, Article 9 (1) provided that the plaintiff 
must bring an action within three years of the time at 
which he first knew, or ought to have known, of the 
harm and the identity of the polluter. These 
provisions give better protection to the victims of 
environmental harm. However, the 1991 Waste 
Directive also has flaws: it does not include liability 
in respect of pollution occurring prior to the 
introduction of the legislation. This means that it  
has no restraints to historic pollutions. Moreover,   
its failure to define certain terms made its    
language sort of vague. For example, under the 
1991 Waste Proposal, liability is assigned on the 
basis of whether or not a person had actual control 
of the waste at the time of pollution; however, the 
Proposal fails to define “actual control” in any of its 
provisions.
c. The Council of Europe Convention on Civil 
Liability
The full name for this convention is the Council of 
Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage 
resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment. Since it was agreed and opened for 
signature at Lugano, Switzerland, it is also called 
the Lugano Convention. As a matter of fact, the 
Lugano Convention was not initiated by the EU; 
instead, it was started by the Council of Europe, 
185which was an entirely distinct body from EU.  In 
June 1993, seven European countries signed the 
Lugano Convention. 
182 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/1/newsid_4679000/4679789.stm
183 OJ No. C 138 of 17 May 1993 (due to run until 2000).
184 Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1991 O.J. (C 192). Hereinafter 1991 Waste Directive.
185 The Council of Europe was formed in 1948 with the purpose of promoting political and military integration in Europe.
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Lugano Convention has 8 chapters in total. There 
are General Provisions, Liability, Access to 
Information, Actions for Compensation and Other 
Claims, Relation between this Convention and 
Other Provisions, The Standing Committee, 
Amendments to the Convention, and Final Clauses. 
It gives detailed definition to important terms used in 
environmental liability regime. For example, it 
defines “operator” as “the person who exercises the 
186control of a dangerous activity.”  And then, it further 
explains “person” means “any individual or 
partnership or any body governed by public or 
private law, whether corporate or not, including a 
187State or any of its constituent subdivisions.”
Article 6 (2) and (3) provide joint and several liability 
with regard to a continuing occurrence or a series of 
consecutive occurrences that have a common 
origin. However, the provisions are definitely not too 
strict on operators since under the provisions, an 
operator is only liable for the specific part of damage 
he or she caused, providing that the operator can 
identify the specific part of the damage which was 
attributable to the period in which he was in charge 
188of the site.
The importance of this convention lies in that fact 
that EU wholly acceded to the convention instead of 
drafting its own. It was used by EU as a stating point 
for an EU initiative and it to some extent precipitated 
the development of the Green Paper.
d. Green Paper on Remedying Environmental 
Damage
In 1993, the European Commission submitted a 
paper to the EU discussing various options to 
remedy environmental damages. This paper is 
called Green Paper on Remedying Environmental 
189Damage.  The Commission believed that an 
effective environmental civil liability regime would 
advance their goals to deter future contamination 
and to compel responsible parties to clean up the 
existing environmental damages. Therefore, the 
Green Paper focused on the adoption of a wider 
system of civil liability based on “polluter should 
pay” principle, covering a broader range of 
activities. 
The paper addresses many important issues 
including strict liability, the difficulty of establishing 
causation in environmental damage cases; whether 
normal civil remedies are adequate to compensate 
for environmental damage; whether adequate 
insurance cover could be provided for increased 
civil liability, etc. There are three main sections in the 
Green Paper. The first section discusses the basic 
questions in the environmental civil liability regime, 
such as liability standard, damages, causation and 
remedies. The second part introduces the joint 
compensation system, its advantages and 
problems. The third section points out the possible 
190directions for community action.  One major 
progress the Green Paper makes compared to the 
1991 Waste Directive is that it considers means by 
which central clean up funds could be established 
for use in circumstances where civil liability cannot 
be established.
One of the features of the Green Paper is that strict 
liability and fault-based liability co-exist in the Paper. 
This is because the Commission has realized that 
there are limitations to strict civil liability. They 
noticed that although applying strict liability could 
help ease plaintiffs' burden of proof by removing   
the need to prove fault, overuse of strict liability    
can only lead to the frustration of industry. As a 
consequence, the Commission has suggested a 
system of joint compensation- a financial structure 
based on charges or contributions. This is similar to 
insurance in that the funds collected are designated 
186 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, March 1993. (Lugano 
Convention), Article 2 (5).
187
 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, March 1993. (Lugano 
Convention), Article 2 (6).
188
 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, March 1993. (Lugano 
Convention), Article 6 (2) (3).
189
 Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47 final, Mar. 1993. Hereinafter, the Green Paper.
190
 Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47 final, Mar. 1993.
for a specific purpose, such as cleaning up or 
restoring the environment. The principle of liability 
for particular acts is expanded into a principle of 
shared responsibility for the impact of multiple 
191acts.  Such joint compensation system is a 
concrete application of the “polluter pays” principle 
since it is sustained by contributions form the 
economic sectors most closely linked to the type of 
damage that needs to be restored. This is quite 
similar to CERCLA in the U.S., which make up for 
the deficiencies of a strict liability scheme. 
EU clearly expressed its intention to establish an 
effective system of civil liability for environmental 
damages in the Green Paper; however, it left the 
most important question unanswered: Who is 
supposed to be held liable? The operator? Or 
perhaps financial institutions such as the insurance 
companies? 
e. White Paper on Environmental Liability
In recent years, EU has experienced a series of 
environmental disaster caused by human beings. 
For example, on December 12, 1999, the Erika 
broke in two off the coast of Brittany, France, 
carrying approximately 30,000 tonnes of fuel oil, 
19,800 tonnes of which were spilled into the sea. It 
took a long time to pump the remaining oil to the 
surface and clean up the polluted coastline. This 
incident resulted in the miserable death of tens of 
192thousands of seabirds and other animals.  
Unfortunately, this is also not the first oil-leak 
incident resulting in serious environmental damage. 
A few months before the Erika incident, in late April 
1998, a dam storing mining waste at the Los Frailes 
lead and zinc mine burst and released a black river 
of toxic sludge that devastated plant and wildlife, 
narrowly missing the Donana nature reserve in 
193south Spain.  EU's response to these events was 
White Paper on Environmental Liability, which is 
frequently referred to as EU's “superfund”. 
The White Paper was eventually published in 
February, 2000. It re-stresses many issues raised in 
the Green Paper, such as imposing strict liability 
and easing the burden of proof. There are 8 parts in 
the White Paper. The first two parts introduce    
some background information and explain what 
environmental liability is. Part 3 is about the 
significance of EU's environmental liability regime. 
Part 4 talks about possible features of EU's 
environmental liability regime. Part 5 makes some 
comparison and contrast of various options for 
action. Part 6 discusses the questions brought by 
subsidiarity and proportionality. Part 7 explores the 
overall economic impact of environmental liability at 
the EU level. Part 8 concludes the next action to set 
up a common environmental civil liability regime in 
194EU.
The main characteristics of EU's environmental civil 
liability regime set by the White Paper are as 
follows: (1) no retroactivity, which means the Paper 
only applies to future damages; (2) the scope of the 
regime not only covers environmental damage, 
which includes damage to biodiversity and damage 
in the form of contamination of sites, but also covers 
traditional damage, which consists of personal 
injury and property damage; (3) strict liability  
applies to damages caused by inherently 
dangerous activities while fault-based liability 
applies to biodiversity damages caused by non-
dangerous activities; (4) allows commonly accepted 
defenses, such as force majeure, contribution to the 
damage or consent by the plaintiff, and intervention 
by a third party, etc, which aims at balance the 
interests of plaintiff and defendant; (5) the liable 
party is the operator who exercises control of an 
activity by which the damage is caused; (6) ensures 
effective decontamination and restoration of        
the environment; (7) “two-tier approach” to access 
to justice; (8) compatible with international 
conventions; (9) provides financial insurance to 
195reduce the risks to which companies are exposed.
191 Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47 final, Mar. 1993. at 20.
192 http://www.iopcfund.org/erika.htm
193 http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/15665/newsDate/26-Apr-2002/story.htm
194 White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (00) 66 final, Sept. 2000. at 3.
195 See White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (00) 66 final, Sept. 2000.
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It is worth mentioning that even though this White 
Paper seems to have a number of effective 
features, it still received a great deal of criticism from 
member states which already had their own 
legislation designed to remedy environmental 
damages. Member states argued that they could 
better address environmental issues according to 
their own domestic situations. The EU argued that 
to have a common environmental civil liability 
regime would avoid distortions with EU's single 
market, since individual liability systems were 
inconsistent. Moreover, crucial principles such as 
the polluter pays principle were not being properly 
applied in some of the member states. Finally, since 
national legislation cannot effectively cover 
transboundary environmental pollution within the 
EU, a common regime was necessary to deal with 
such incidents.
f.  Directive on Environmental Liability
In 2004, EU adopted another Directive relating       
to environmental protection, that is, Directive on 
Environmental Liability with Regard to the 
Prevention and Remedying of Environmental 
196Damage.  The purpose of this Directive is to 
establish a framework of environmental liability 
based on the “polluter-pays” principle, to prevent 
197and remedy environmental damage.  There are 23 
articles in total and two annexes.
“Damage” is defined in this Directive as “a 
measureable adverse change in a natural   
resource or measurable impairment of a natural 
resource service which may occur directly or 
198indirectly.”  Environmental damages cover three 
categories: natural damage, water damage and 
land damage. It requires a “significant adverse 
effect or risk.” However, how “significant” it should 
be is not defined.
Article 7 provides a chance for operators to identify 
the potential remedial measures and submit them to 
the competent government authority for approval. 
The authority has the power to decide and choose 
which remedial measures shall be implemented.   
On the contrary, Directive 2004 does not address 
situations in which the operators and the 
government authority disagree about the necessary 
remedial measures to be taken. Maybe in that case, 
the authority could perform the measures deemed 
199necessary and recover the costs incurred later.
Directive 2004 does not apply to environmental 
damages or imminent threats of such damages 
arising from oil spill incidents, carriage of hazardous 
and toxic substances by sea, by road, rail or inland 
ships. This is because civil liabilities for such 
damages have already been covered by a number 
of international conventions. It also does not apply 
to nuclear risks, as Article 4 (5) says that damage 
caused by pollution of a diffuse character is only 
covered “where it is possible to establish causation 
between the damage and the activities of individual 
200operators.”  Finally, the Directive does not apply to 
national defense, international security and civil 
201protection activities.  The statutory limitation is 30 
years, since Article 17 says that when more than 30 
years have passed since the emission, event or 
incident that caused the damage occurred, 
Directive 2004 will not apply.
3.3.3. Features of EU's Environmental Civil 
Liability
 a.  Liability Standard
The English case Rylands v. Fletcher pronounces a 
standard of strict liability- that is, liability imposed 
even without a finding of negligence on the part of 
the defendant. Even though this standard of liability 
was born in one of the member states of the EU, the 
196 Hereinafter Directive 2004.
197 Directive on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004/35/EC. Article 1.
198 Directive on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004/35/EC. Article 2 (2).
199 Directive on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004/35/EC. Article 6 and 8.
200 Directive on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004/35/EC. Article 4 (5).
201 Directive on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004/35/EC. Article 4 (6).
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idea of applying it to environmental damages was 
definitely not so widely and quickly accepted by the 
EU as it was by the U.S. Critics of strict liability said 
that in certain situations, fault-based liability may 
provide a superior incentive for complying with 
regulatory standards than strict liability and relied on 
an empirical study which showed that the 
introduction of strict liability led to an increase in 
202automobile accidents.  However, the use of fault-
based liability in environmental tort became a                
big problem, since fault-based liability does not 
adequately prevent pollution from occurring. Then 
the Commission began to accept strict liability 
theory in environmental damages.
The 1991 draft proposal- Waste Directive provided 
that “[t]he producer of waste shall be liable under 
civil law for the damage and impairment of the 
environment caused by the waste, irrespective of 
203fault on his part.”  The producer is defined as 
anybody “who in the course of a commercial or 
industrial activity, produces waste and/or anyone 
who carries out pre-processing, mixing or other 
operations resulting in a change in the nature or 
204composition of this waste.”  Additionally, importers 
of waste are also considered to be producers as are 
those who had actual control of the waste at the time 
the pollution occurred, unless they can identify the 
originator of the waste and those responsible for 
any installation, establishment or undertaking at 
which the waste was held at the time the pollution 
205occurred.  In the Waste Directive, the only 
available defense to strict liability is force majeure. 
And as mentioned before, liabilities for historic 
pollution are also excluded.
The Lugano Convention requires signatories to 
introduce strict liability with regard to “dangerous 
activities”. It says that “[t]he operator in respect of a 
dangerous activity… shall be liable for the damage 
caused by the activity as a result of the incidents at 
the time or during the period when he was 
exercising control of that activity.” Defenses 
provided by the Convention are set out in Article 8: 
the operator shall not be held liable in respect of 
incidents resulting from acts of war, hostilities, civil 
war, insurrection or natural phenomena of “an 
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character”. 
Moreover, there are other exemptions such as 
liability with regard to deliberate damage caused by 
a third party when the operator has taken sufficient 
measures to prevent such events; compliance with 
a specific order or compulsory measure of a public 
authority; pollution which is at tolerable levels 
according to local circumstance; activities 
undertaken lawfully in the interests of the person 
who suffered the damage provided that the action 
206was reasonable.  
Either Green Paper or White Paper expresses the 
need to apply strict liability standard to 
environmental tort. The Green Paper argued from 
the standpoint of the polluter pays principle. It said 
that strict liability accorded more closely with the 
polluter pays principle in that it requires the operator 
to internalize a greater proportion of the pollution 
costs. It also noted the difficulties for the plaintiff to 
establish fault where the operator complied with 
regulatory standards. The White Paper supported 
this opinion and also stated that activities which are 
not dangerous per se, but have the potential, in 
certain circumstances, to cause health damage or 
significant environmental damage should also be 
subject to strict liability.
In conclusion, it seems that strict liability standard is 
becoming popular in the EU's environmental civil 
liability regime. And the EU certainly does not apply 
the standard blindly. It also provides defenses and 
limitations to the strict liability rule in order to prevent 
it from turning absolute liability.
b. Burden of Proof
The difficulties encountered by plaintiffs in 
establishing causation are discussed in Section II in 
202 Devlin, R.A., Some Welfare Implications of No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes, 10 International Review of Law and Economics 193.
203 Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1991 O.J. (C 192), article 3.
204 Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1991 O.J. (C 192), article 2 (1)(a).
205 Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1991 O.J. (C 192), article 2 (1)(a)©.
206 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, March 1993.
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this paper. Regarding this problem, EU is trying to 
balance the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, in 
order to reduce the burden of proof on causation for 
victims in its legislations without holding operators 
liable for damages to which they did not contribute. 
In 1991 Waste Directive, Article 4 (1) (c) says that
The burden of proof on the plaintiff, when 
affirming the causal link between the wastes on 
the one hand and the damage or impairment of 
the environment suffered or likely to be suffered 
on the other hand; the burden of proof shall be 
no higher than the standard burden of proof in 
207civil law.
Article 10 of Lugano Convention provides that
When considering evidence of the causal link 
between the incident and the damage or, in    
the context of a dangerous activity as defined   
in Article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph d, 
between the activity and the damage, the court 
shall take due account of the increased danger 
of causing such damage inherent in the 
208dangerous activity.
Obviously this provision requires courts to use a 
lesser standard of proof if the operation in question 
is particularly suited to causing the damage in 
question. However, the words are rather vague 
since they do not clearly define how much is the 
“due amount”.
Both the Green Paper and the White Paper clearly 
expressed the concern for the difficulties in 
establishing a causation connection in modern 
environmental tort, and reiterated the need to ease 
the burden of proof regarding causation. However, 
neither of them expands upon how this would be 
achieved. Maybe in light of these considerations 
and some successful examples of its member 
states, the EU will come up with some harmonized 
causation tests within environmental civil liability 
regime sooner or later.
c.  Standing
In tort theory, liability is contingent on personal loss. 
Thus, technically speaking, claims based on 
environmental damages should be brought by 
individuals who experienced personal injury or 
whose property rights were interfered in the 
pollution. Yet under some circumstances, 
individuals may choose not to sue. Further, even if 
they decide to bring a lawsuit, the information gap 
between the claimants and the polluters often 
prevents plaintiffs from pursuing their rights. In this 
case, it is necessary to recognize the existence of 
an equitable public interest in environmental 
protection. That is, reducing the limitations to 
standing.
In a number of EU member states, legislators have 
already begun to dilute the differences between   
the public interests and the individual interests in 
environmental matters in order to provide standing 
to non-governmental organizations. To better 
protect the public interest in the environment, the 
EU requires its member states in Waste Directive to 
guarantee the standing of interest groups. It notes 
that common interest groups or associations, which 
have as their object the protection of nature and   
the environment, shall have the right to seek any 
209remedy or to join in legal proceedings.  
In Article 18 of the Lugano Convention, it states that 
the Convention affords standing to “any association 
or foundation which according to its statutes aims  
at the protection of the environment” if it meet       
the precondition of compliance with any further 
210conditions of internal law.  This provision enables 
an organization to take legal actions to prohibit 
dangerous and unlawful activities that pose            
207 Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1991 O.J. (C 192), article 4 (1)(c).
208 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, March 1993. (Lugano 
Convention), article 10.
209 Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1991 O.J. (C 192), article 4 (3).
210 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, March 1993. (Lugano 
Convention), article 18.
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a threat to the environment, and meanwhile, leaves 
domestic jurisdictions freedom to decide when such 
a request should be accepted.
However, environmental pressure groups are      
not granted the right to sue through all the          
EU's conventions. In Green Paper, the notion       
that interest group should be afforded standing is 
entirely rejected. It notes that “where damage 
occurs to property that is not owned, no injured party 
with the right to bring a legal action can be identified. 
With no legal or natural person to sue on behalf       
of the environment, the costs of restoring 
environmental damage cannot be recovered via 
211civil liability.”
The White Paper somewhat changed the extreme 
rule set up in the Green Paper., as it appears to 
provide public interest groups with the right to      
sue while also restricting their power. It concedes 
that “there are limits to the availability of public 
resources for this, and there is a growing 
acknowledgement that the public at large should 
feel responsible for the environment and should 
212under circumstances be able to act on it behalf.”  It 
sets up a two tier approach: first, member states 
should be under a duty to ensure restoration of 
biodiversity damage and decontamination by using 
the compensation or damages paid by the polluters; 
second, if the government does not act at all or 
responds in an inadequate manner, public interest 
213groups would act on a subsidiary basis.  This 
approach is significant in that it provides public 
interest groups certain, not excessive power, while 
at the same time preventing government authorities 
from shirking their responsibilities.
Articles 11 and 12 of Directive 2004 provide to 
natural or legal persons who are “affected or likely to 
be affected by environmental damage” a right to 
request the competent authority to take action in 
order to prevent or remedy environmental damage. 
A non-governmental environmental protection 
organization shall be deemed to have a sufficient 
interest or to have rights which are capable of being 
impaired. These persons shall have access to a 
court to ask for reviews of the procedural and 
substantial legality of the decisions, acts or failures 
 214of the government authority.
d.  Remedies
For some time, some have argued that an effective 
environmental civil liability regime should not      
only reflect private loss but also environmental 
impairment. The EU has been working as regards 
environmental impairment for a while and really 
made some progress.
The 1991 Waste Proposal allows for the recovery    
of damages caused by waste in respect of       
death, physical injury, damage to property           
and environmental impairment. It defines 
“environmental impairment” as: “any significant 
physical, chemical or biological deterioration of the 
environment insofar as this is not considered to be 
damage within the meaning of sub-paragraph (c) 
215(11).”  As to significant deterioration, it refers to the 
damages that are tangible and capable of being 
rectified.
In common with the Waste Proposal, Lugano 
Convention also includes recovery for death, 
personal and property damages and injury to       
the environment. It also gives a definition to 
“environmental impairment”:
loss or damage by impairment of the 
environment in so far as this is not considered    
to be damage within the meanings of sub-
paragraphs a or b above provided that 
compensat ion for  impairment of  the 
environment, other than for loss of profit from 
such impairment, shall be limited to the costs of 
211 Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47 final, Mar. 1993. at 11.
212 White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (00) 66 final, Sept. 2000. at 21.
213 White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (00) 66 final, Sept. 2000. at 22.
214 Directive on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004/35/EC. Article 11 and 12.
215 Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1991 O.J. (C 192).
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measures of reinstatement actually undertaken 
or to be undertaken; the costs of preventive 
measures and any loss or damage caused by 
216preventive measures.
Compared to the definition provided by the Waste 
Proposal, this definition is somewhat vague and 
complex.
The Green Paper recognizes the difficulty to place a 
monetary value on certain environmental damages, 
and thus, it focuses on the costs of tangible 
environmental restoration. It also realizes that it is 
hard to identify at which point the environment 
becomes sufficiently degraded by pollution to 
217warrant remedies.  In the White Paper, it points out 
that restoration of the environment to its exact 
former status may not be technically realistic or 
financially viable, whereas it does not come up with 
218any functional solutions.
From the discussion above, we can conclude that 
even though the EU focused its attention only on 
economic revival at the beginning, after it realized 
how important environmental protection could be, it 
is gradually making progress in establishing an 
effective environmental civil liability regime and it 
has reached some significant achievements. 
Certainly the EU's environmental civil liability 
regime is not a perfect one; however, by learning 
from successful examples and unsuccessful 
lessons of its member states or other countries, 
such as the U.S, its environmental civil liability 
regime will become more effective.
Civil liability is the most significant liability in the 
environmental liability regime since it is the regime 
most frequently used in environmental pollution 
cases.  Environmental tort has developed new 
features in addition to those found in traditional tort. 
For instance, tortious actions no longer directly act 
on injured party; instead, the environment can be a 
medium that results in physical or mental injury to 
victims. Also, since the source of a contaminant is 
sometimes difficult to locate with current 
technology, environmental polluters can be difficult 
to identify.  Further, it is also not easy to pinpoint the 
victims under some circumstances. Moreover, in an 
environmental tort case, the status of plaintiff and 
defendant is not equal because of the unbalanced 
economic status and the information available to the 
respective parties; many environmental damages 
have significant latency periods, and this can cause 
problems identifying the injury. Regarding the scope 
of environmental harm, once the tortious action has 
caused harm to the environment, the result tends to 
be more severe than those in traditional tort.  
Finally, in some situations, the actions that caused 
physical injury or property damage to other people 
might not necessarily violate the law. 
There are three elements that constitute 
environmental civil liability: conduct, harm and 
causation. Since the new features of environmental 
tort place plaintiffs in a relatively weak position, 
most countries reduce the burden of proof on 
plaintiffs, apply strict liability standard in cases 
relating environmental damages, extend statutory 
l imitat ions, and remove some standing 
requirements. On the other hand, in order not to be 
too strict on defendants and not to restrict too much 
on the growth of economy, defendants are provided 
with some defenses and exemptions against 
environmental civil liability. 
The United States and the European Union worked 
a lot on their environmental civil liability systems. 
United States regulates it in two ways: by common 
law and by statutes. The most important statute with 
regards to environmental civil liability is CERCLA, 
the “Superfund”. Both common law and statutes 
have its own advantages and disadvantages; 
together, they work well to help the United States to 
set up a well-functioning environmental civil liability 
regime. The European Union changed its approach 
CONCLUSIONES
216 The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, March 1993. (Lugano 
Convention), article 7.
217 See Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47 final, Mar. 1993.
218 See White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (00) 66 final, Sept. 2000.
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to the relationship between the economy and the 
environment after it realized that environmental 
problems could totally destroy the fruits of economic 
development. It drafted and proposed a number of 
directives and papers to regulate Member States' 
environmental civil liability regimes. 
Furthermore, legislation regarding environmental 
civil liability in European Union and the United 
States share some common features. Both apply 
the strict liability standard, reduce the burden of 
proof on the plaintiffs, expand standing to 
environmental interest groups, and meanwhile also 
provide basic defenses to the defendants. Most of 
European Union's environmental legislations were 
passed after the U.S. “Superfund.” This means that 
European Union has opportunities to learn from the 
U.S example and also to avoid U.S failures in 
drafting and implementing legislation on 
environmental civil liability, if any. I hope this study 
on modern environmental civil liability and overview 
of the environmental civil liability regimes in the U.S 
and the EU will help China's legislators learn from 
their successful examples if they are applicable to 
our national conditions, while also trying to avoid 
any unsuccessful policy experiences.
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